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Abstracts 
Chapter 1 
Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) have emerged as 
prominent actors in the global marketplace since the median decades of 
the twentieth century. The unique role of energy in informing global 
trade flows, supply and demand, and overall wealth distribution 
renders IGOs interacting with the energy sector particularly critical to 
shaping the worldwide economic order; and yet, a quantitative system 
of classifying IGOs has yet to be articulated. Grounded in rational 
design and rational choice theory, this body of research selects a 
population of IGOs based on the following criteria: formal agreement 
between sovereign states, independent institutions or organizations 
dependent upon IGOs, energy-focused agenda, permanent 
bureaucratic system, and active-status. Given these criteria, a model is 
articulated for classifying IGOs interacting within the energy sector, 
with conclusions drawn regarding links between apparent, 
participatory variability of IGOs and environmental forces. Key 
conclusions include the increase in consumption-driven IGOs and 
decrease of production-driven IGOs which is indicative of the 
interconnectivity of market trends and the quantity and function of 
energy-focused IGO agendas. 
Chapter 2 
Why do states choose to join and form IGOs that regulate energy 
policy? In this paper we make three specific contributions to the 
literature on international cooperation and diffusion. First, we show 
that countries form and join energy IGOs in response to memberships 
previously gained by direct competitors among oil and gas producers 
and consumers. Moreover, we demonstrate that energy IGOs diffuse 
among countries that share oil and gas pipelines.  Finally, we provide 
evidence that the institutional design of established energy IGOs 
impacts the development of their membership network. To test these 
hypotheses, we rely on original data on oil and gas pipelines and the 
design of energy IGOs as well as on a newly compiled dataset that 
includes 152 countries and covers 38 years (1970-2007). We employ 
both network analysis and spatial econometrics. 
Chapter 3 
XVI 
 
The goal of this paper is to provide an explanation for the formation 
of energy intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) among energy 
consumer or consumer/producer countries, predicated on the need to 
make alliances for energy security. The paper uses a two-stage model to 
explain the formation of energy IGOs and following this formation, the 
actions of the state within the IGO. The first stage, called the bargaining 
stage, involves the negotiation process for formation of the energy IGO, 
which is based on existing alliances and shared energy concerns. The 
second stage, called the enforcement stage, involves the actions of the 
state within the IGO, including the formation of shared energy security 
frameworks and common policies, based on shared energy concerns 
and infrastructure development needs. Two qualitative analytical case 
studies, the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), are used to demonstrate the use of 
this model and provide support for the hypotheses.  
Chapter 4 
This research addresses the national-level effects on energy 
competition that occur when a National Regulatory Authority (NRA) 
enters a European Network of Energy Regulators (ENER) competition 
in the electricity and gas sectors. The approach chosen uses a policy 
making model with four actors (NRA, Industry, Government, and 
European Commission) and one instrument (ENER), based on the 
previous work of Putnam (1988). This policy model is demonstrated 
qualitatively using selected case studies of this situation, including the 
Czech Republic‘s adaptation to CEER standards and Spain and the 
creation of ACER. For both case studies, changes in conditions of 
competition, accountability, independence, and transparency are 
assessed. These results show that the policy model as constructed does 
provide explanatory value for an increase in competition in the energy 
sectors of member states of ENER through the mechanisms of 
increasing accountability, transparency, and independence of policy 
decision-making. 
XVII 
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- 1 - 
A Quantitative Description of Energy IGOs 
1. Introduction 
The increasing fluidity in movement of people, goods, services, 
information, and ideas represents the crux of globalization, with 
evolving forms of governance seeking to enact various policy initiatives 
in order to regulate these unprecedented, cross-national exchanges 
(Abbot and Snidal 2009). The energy sector, like all industries, has been 
forcefully impacted by the new global order, with evolutions in both 
the energy industry itself as well as mechanisms of regulation visibly 
changing since the median decades of the twentieth century. 
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are comprised of various 
member-states which are bound by treaty; they are legal entities 
distinguishable from less formal coalitions and task groups, and, more 
saliently, they represent the relationship of sovereign states connected 
to one another via treaty, rather than the treaty itself. Emerging as 
integral to the global marketplace in the twenty-first century, IGOs 
control the activities of actors within the political, economic, and social 
spheres, implementing and enforcing laws (Abbot and Snidal 2009). As 
the global supply chain has shifted and expanded considerably during 
recent years, rendering IGOs a salient solution to the problem of 
insufficient mechanisms of regulation, the need for a system of 
classifying these entities with respect to the energy sector has emerged 
as both urgent and necessary. This body of research seeks to provide a 
quantitative system for classifying IGOs working with the energy 
sector, affording particular attention to the evolution of IGOs‘ role in 
the energy sector over time.  
IGOs are both influential of and informed by global policy sectors, 
with the structures of IGO networks bound to patterns of production 
and consumption. Empirical evidence suggests that many IGOs have 
become industry-specific when they engage primarily in the economic 
sphere, with IGOs interacting with the energy sector being particularly 
integral to the existing power differentials between developed and 
developing nations (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006). Energy 
represents the most valuable and integral input factor for economic 
production; it directly informs the nature of trade, distribution of 
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wealth, and shifts within supply and demand trends across the global 
marketplace (Brams 1966). IGOs directing energy security policy, by 
extension, are concurrently informing patterns within the entire, 
worldwide economy.  
This body of research then fills a wide gap in the literature by 
articulating a means of classifying these organisations which are so 
informative of the global order. This work first articulates a theoretical 
rationale for the quantitative classification grounded in rational design 
and rational choice, before delineating criteria for inclusion and 
exclusion in the study. The extreme and mounting diversity of IGOs 
across the sixty-six year period which provided the temporal context 
for this study was markedly evident, with the evolution of IGOs‘ 
influence apparent between 1945 and 2011. Undergirding this study is 
the reality of IGOs as increasingly influential entities which are shaping 
not only the energy sector but the entire system of global trade. 
Consequently, the rationale for this model is the prominent role of 
IGOs in conjunction with the weighted role of energy as a uniquely 
regulated commodity. 
2. Theoretical approach to the Compilation: Rational Design Theory 
This chapter aims to produce an accurate measure of the number 
and characteristics of the IGOs dealing with the energy sector. Our time 
frame starts right after the Second World War in 1945 and ends in 2011. 
We divide this 66-year period into five-year periods, in order to show 
the variation in number and membership that these IGOs have had 
throughout the period. Relying on the early compilation by Wallace 
and Singer (1970), we are particularly interested in three indexes of 
these energy IGOs: (1) the number of IGOs in each of the five-year 
periods; (2) the number of nations which are members of each IGO; and 
(3) a weighted measure of the importance of IGOs' membership from 
which to derive the relevance of a single energy IGO in the overall 
energy IGO system at a given time. Each of these points will in turn be 
discussed, but first it is useful to focus on the criteria to determine the 
population of IGO examined in this analysis. 
We should first deal with the reason that led us to solely focus on 
international intergovernmental organizations, therefore excluding 
nongovernmental organizations from our analysis. First, while their 
influence is increasing, energy NGOs are not as relevant as NGOs 
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operating in other policy and economic fields and, in most cases, their 
influence is at best seriously limited in time and space. This means that 
NGOs do not really correspond to our theoretical interest, which is to 
study how supranational bodies can continuously interact with 
national entities. Moreover, their number is yet not sufficient to 
produce a sound empirical analysis. A second issue touches upon our 
interest in the number of countries that are member of our pool of 
organizations at any point of our timeframe. There is not enough 
material to determine such a measure for NGOs, which is another 
substantial reason to exclude them from the current analysis. However, 
we do recognize that the relevance of energy NGOs is growing, and the 
scholarly community should devote more research to solve the 
aforementioned measure problems, so that a quantitative description of 
energy NGOs is possible in the future. 
A second aspect to discuss before proceeding with our analysis is 
the limitation that comes from the energy IGO pool we have selected. 
We have developed a set of criteria to discriminate among them in 
terms of their design, providing a theoretical focus to lead us in our 
inquiry. While this preliminary analysis intends to describe rather than 
postulate, this quantitative description is the source from which the 
following chapters stem, and is therefore highly connected to our 
subsequent hypotheses. Our main theoretical reference can be found in 
the rational design theory (see Goodin 1998; Koremenos et al. 2001; 
Wendt 2001; Olsen 2002). The rational design theory situates itself in 
the middle of the heated debate on the meaning and role of 
international governmental organizations. The realist school of 
international relations argues that intergovernmental organizations 
have little significance in the geostrategic and economic arena because 
states never allow them to take over control of issues. On the contrary, 
the constructivist school emphasizes the active and autonomous role 
that many institutions have been playing in the international 
environment. The rational design theory acknowledges both claims, 
tracing their limits and perspectives. On one hand, IGOs have a say in 
the normative discourse, though they heavily remain anchored to 
determination of states. On the other hand, states create IGOs with a 
design that can influence the subsequent state action on the issues 
treated by the IGOs. As novelists' works are created with a purpose but 
then autonomously evolve in the interpretation and conscience of 
readers, states create IGOs with an international configuration in mind, 
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which is quite likely to change, opening new scenarios for the role of 
IGOs. Koremenos et al. have crafted a clear-cut definition of what IGOs 
are and can do: ‗states use international institutions to further their own 
goals, and they design institutions accordingly‘ and as a consequence 
IGOs can be defined as ‗ explicit arrangements, negotiated among 
international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize 
behaviour‘ (Koremenos 2001: 762). It is certainly possible to confront 
the compilation of energy IGOs from others points of view. Yet, 
rational design theory and rational choice analysis represent for us a 
very convincing theory and a compatible system to effectuate our 
coding. Rational design is suitable to empirical classification, which is 
the main scope of this section. It is also coherent with our subsequent 
development of testable hypotheses. 
Rational design is an extensive model that addresses multiple 
aspects of foundation and operation of the IGO. It is also extensively 
structural and institutional in origin, and is often more suited to 
analysis of a single organization rather than multiple organizations, as 
is done throughout this compilation. Because of this, many of the 
variables within the rational design model may seem to fade into the 
background, while the two variables that have been added 
(coordinated oligopolistic systems and aid in case of energy shortages) 
may seem to take precedence. We acknowledge that this is the case, 
particularly in the qualitative analysis, where there may be some 
emphasis placed on one or more aspects of the framework in order to 
progress usefully. However, this does not mean that we have not used 
the other variables that were included in the original model by 
Koromenos et al. (2001). Although the variables in rational design can 
be difficult to operationalize on a grand scale, they posed no such 
problems for the qualitative analysis in Chapters 2 and 3. Thus, they 
were used extensively in these chapters to explore particular issues. 
This is one of the key reasons why this volume includes both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. It also showcases the rational 
design model as an analysis tool that can inform multiple aspects of 
institutional formation and expansion, as well as operations and 
interests that take place within the institution.  
There are many cases where the rational design model can be seen 
in action in this analysis. The variables included in the original model 
were energy shortages, control power, scope, structure, centralization, 
and flexibility. In many cases, we found these variables difficult to 
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operationalize in a rational manner that could address the 
commonalities of all the institutions or states involved in our analysis. 
For example, flexibility was exceptionally difficult to operationalize on 
a large scale, despite the description offered by Koromenos et al. (2001). 
This means that many of these variables are considered either in an 
implied manner or directly in the qualitative analysis. Energy shortages 
are of course directly implied in the added functional variable of aid in 
case of energy shortages. Chapter 4 also addresses aspects of energy 
shortages, in its discussion of market liberalization and diversification 
in the Czech Republic and Spain. This market liberalization and 
diversification through CEER and ACER respectively is directly related 
to the need to reduce energy shortages. Issues of control power are 
discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, where conflicts involved in joining 
energy IGOs are examined and the role of the state and the 
international arena are considered. Similarly, the scope of energy IGOs 
and conditions that are necessary and sufficient for their coverage are 
examined in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 and 4 also address centralization in 
their qualitative examination of the causes and effects of energy IGO 
membership on states. Thus, even though the variables included in the 
rational design model as proposed by Koromenos et al. (2001) are not 
always explicitly outlined within the framework used in this research, 
especially in the quantitative work in Chapter 2, the structural and 
institutional concerns that the model expresses are actually at the core 
of the analysis and are routinely taken into account and examined 
explicitly within the qualitative analysis.    
3. Prior Works and Scope of this Classification 
As far as we can determine, this is the first dataset that lists all the 
energy intergovernmental organizations that have operated in the 1960-
2011 period. However, a number of compilations concerning 
intergovernmental organizations in general have been completed 
throughout the decades. Since our period of interest is relatively recent, 
the quality of data available is good, but not flawless. For example, the 
Union of International Associations has been publishing the Yearbook 
of International Organizations since 1910. The Yearbook is generally 
considered the main source for those scholars interested in the study of 
IGOs. Yet, as Wallace and Singer had already noted in the 1970s, when 
they were compiling their early dataset for the Correlates of Wars 
project, incompleteness characterizes some sections of the post-war 
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editions of the book. Another issue that impinges on the overall quality 
of data is the lack of a consistent methodology to determine which 
IGOs to select and how to model their membership systems. Most of 
the data are collected through questionnaires compiled by the IGOs' 
secretariats. This compilation therefore reflected the internal biases of 
each organization, which basically categorized itself (Wallace and 
Singer 1970; Abbott and Snidal 1998). 
These issues demanded a revision of the coding system, both from a 
qualitative and a quantitative point of view. Qualitatively, it was 
necessary to clearly determine what the object of the classification was. 
For example, the classification scheme may or may not include those 
IGOs open to private memberships as well as to states. It was also 
important to choose a theoretical reference for the coding that clearly 
determined the objectives and limits of the whole operation. 
Quantitatively, it was relevant to collect polished data. This required 
that we assume a coherent and independent stance in the collection 
process, so that the derived analysis did not show sign of bias. A 
limited group of scholars has taken up the challenge posed by these 
queries (see Alger 1970; Wallace and Singer 1970; Taylor and Groom 
1977). However, none of these authors have concentrated on a specific 
policy sector. Instead, all their analyses have been universalistic in 
scope and means. On the contrary, we are interested in the specific 
policy field of energy governance, where IGOs work together with 
numerous protocols and agreements of various sorts, which are 
sometimes hard to distinguish from a fully-fledged IGO. Therefore, 
while we rely on the methodology and considerations of previous 
universalist analyses and we shaped our research on the rational 
design approach, our research has been adapted to the peculiar world 
of energy, where economics, geopolitics and trade and strongly 
entangled with each other. We hope that this analysis, as simple and 
plain as it is meant to be, may serve to open the debate on the best 
methods to code IGOs in sensitive fields where the general coding rules 
may turn out to be inadequate or insufficient to fully describe the 
population pool. 
4. Determining the Criteria for IGOs Selection 
Our population of IGOs was selected on the basis of the following 
criteria. First, the IGO must be the product of a formal agreement 
between governments of nation states. They should include at least 
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three sovereign states. It could be argued that IGOs collecting two 
members may be included if the organization is in principle open to 
new memberships. However, we believe that only multilateral energy 
IGOs allow state a real negotiation on the IGO design. This choice is 
made to exclude bilateral pacts from our analysis, because inter-
governmental organizations imply multilateral relations among their 
members. Moreover, bilateral pacts tend to be established in the form 
of contracts, while our approach emphasizes the importance of IGOs' 
rule making. A two-member IGO is not required to accommodate the 
interests of multiple stakeholders in the same way as a multilateral 
IGO. Thus, it does not fall under the guidelines of our theoretical 
framework, which is concerned with multilateral negotiations. 
Second, the included IGOs can be independent institutions or 
organizations that are dependent on or subordinate to existing IGOs. 
Third, it should include energy among its founding provisions and one 
of its main areas of action, if not its sole area of action.  Energy IGOs are 
understood as IGOs that can regulate and legislate on energy matters. 
This is the most stringent criterion for an IGO to qualify for our 
analysis. Organizations that loosely refer to energy matters in their 
records, or which did not have any regulatory force, were therefore 
excluded. Some organizations, such as the European Union and the 
Eurasian Economic Community, developed energy chapters later in 
their existence. Energy provisions were absent at the founding 
moment, when most states had to decide whether to join or not. 
Consequently, we dropped these organizations because they are not 
relevant for our research question, since energy concerns did not drive 
the foundation or joining of the IGO. 
Fourth, the organization should display some sort of permanent 
bureaucratic arrangement in the form of a secretariat or headquarters. 
It is acceptable that the secretariat is hosted by a single member or 
housed in national headquarters, provided that its status allows the 
secretariat to perform permanent tasks, thus excluding temporary 
actions or taskforces. For design, IGOs are coded once the secretariat is 
established; before that moment we do not consider it possible to code 
the organization. This criterion does not necessarily reflect on the 
structure of this institution. It is enough that the IGO has a body of 
people who work on the organizational tasks in a continuous way. On 
the contrary, we do not consider budget as a relevant measure for 
determining the IGO status of organizations. Budget is a delicate issue 
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that most times is not fully public and therefore does not allow for clear 
measurements. Moreover, we can presume that where there is a 
secretariat a budget to feed it should be in place (Wallace and Singer 
1970: 246). 
Finally, the IGO has to be active. That is, it must organize a regular 
plenary session at least once every two years. We are more interested in 
the actual life of the organization rather than in the dates established on 
treaties. Periodic meetings verify the vitality of multilateral cooperation 
bodies, as they normally present a display of their overall achievements 
during these meetings. The two-year period seems adequate because it 
considers that IGOs' activities are most frequently conducted through 
smaller groups (e.g., ministerial meetings, working groups, steering 
committees). We start counting the organization when the secretariat is 
in place and a first plenary meeting has been held. We declare the 
death of an institution if more than two years pass without any plenary 
meeting. 
In order to select the organizations we included in this study, we 
first consulted the Yearbook of International Organizations, which is 
compiled on an annual basis by the Union of International 
Organizations. This resource offers a comprehensive listing of 
international non-profit organizations, including intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations, and currently lists over 66,000 
organisations across various fields (Union of International 
Organizations, 2013). The Yearbook of International Organizations has 
been published on an annual basis since 1910, and as such provided full 
coverage for the entire period of concern. The online database offers 
extensive information about the organizations that it profiles, including 
the location, years active, member states, and area of interest and 
coverage. This resource allowed us to generate an initial list of 
organizations that were potentially appropriate for inclusion in the 
quantitative aspect of this study, as well as providing details 
surrounding the organizations. The list that was generated from the 
Yearbook of International Organizations was then checked for 
completeness using Web searches and comparison to partial lists held 
by the OECD and other organizations in order to make sure there were 
no significant gaps that could be identified. While it is possible that this 
method of data collection did result in some missing organizations 
(particularly small or short-lived organizations), there were no 
significant omissions found during the crosschecking process. We 
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believe that the list used in this research was as complete as possible 
given the available sources of information. 
Following the generation of the initial list of candidate organizations 
for inclusion, we created a matrix to determine criteria matching. This 
matrix collated information from the Yearbook of International 
Organizations, verified where possible with organizational histories 
and current announcements and information. These histories were in 
some cases incomplete, but provided valuable secondary support for 
the Yearbook information and in some cases filled in missing 
information. The criteria listed above were used for filtering 
organizations. We first excluded all organizations that were not active, 
based on a date of the last general meeting within the past three years. 
Second, we excluded organizations that did not have a permanent 
secretariat or headquarters (either independently or under the auspices 
of a parent organization). Third, we eliminated organizations that did 
not include three or more member states, based on the inclusion criteria 
that the organizations must be multi-lateral organizations and not 
bilateral organizations. Following this initial filtering of the results set 
obtained from the Yearbook of International Organizations, we 
undertook a more detailed assessment of the remaining organizations. 
The first step was identifying the formal agreements that the 
organizations were based on. This was primarily done through 
assessment of the organization‘s own information, including 
organizational histories, founding charters, and other available 
information. If no formal agreement could be found that was associated 
with its founding, then the organization was excluded. The final stage 
of assessment was the determination of whether energy was a 
foundational aspect of the organization‘s founding. This stage was 
somewhat more subjective than assessment of other criteria, since there 
is no clear delimitation of where energy as one of the issues involved, 
or as a peripheral issue, and focus on energy as a main concern of the 
organization should be divided. However, with most of the 
organizations it was reasonably simple to determine whether energy 
was significant enough for inclusion in the study.    
Building on the rational design theory outlined by Koremenos et al. 
(2001), we developed a coding scheme that takes care of the variance in 
the population of energy inter-governmental organizations. Our 
questions, illustrated in table 1.b, did not simply look for positive or 
negative responses, but were developed to ascertain different levels of 
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design refinement, providing two to five different possible answers for 
each. With the aim of uncovering the linkage between the strength of 
the design features and the success in the diffusion of the 
corresponding energy IGO, we considered eight dimensions: 
membership, coordinated oligopolistic systems, aid in case of energy 
shortages, control power, scope, structure, centralization, and 
flexibility. Some of these dimensions were further refined in two 
different questions. This coding scheme is distinct from the coding 
scheme used in the original rational design theory (Koromenos et al., 
2001), in that we included several functional variables that were not 
included in the original study. Specifically, we include coordinated 
oligopolistic systems and aid in case of energy shortage. These two 
additions were made based on a review of the literature review and 
consideration of the structures and functions of the organizations 
involved, and determination that these two features serve as a growing 
part of the energy IGO‘s structure and purpose.  
Although they were not included in the original model proposed by 
Koromenos et al. (2001), we feel that these variables add increased 
depth and breadth to the assessment of design features of the IGO and 
its development. The addition of functional variables was initially 
proposed based on the observation that the original variables were 
primarily structural or institutional, and did not reflect the actual 
methods of operation of the IGO. This was an inadequate view in our 
opinion because it did not take into account the differences in energy 
IGO function and operation. The inclusion of coordinated oligopolistic 
systems is important because it speaks to increased market 
coordination and regulatory coordination generated by the energy IGO 
between member states in the IGO, which is one of the key points of 
this research. The inclusion of aid in case of energy shortage is also 
highly relevant because of increasing importance of energy security in 
national security policies. Thus, these two variables represent some 
responses to the changing conditions that member states may be facing 
in setting energy policy. This is not an exhaustive list of potential 
variables, and others could have been included. However, coordinated 
oligopolistic systems and aid in case of energy shortage were some of 
the most common conditions that were identified, as well as some of 
the most relevant. Thus, the expansion of the rational design theory 
described by Koromenos et al. (2001) using these two variables is 
justified as an innovation that adds specific functional variables to the 
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model that address the changing conditions in the energy market and 
potentially relevant conditions to the energy IGO‘s formation and 
structure. In this article we concentrate on the enumerative aspects of 
the coding, but these questions will be explored and used in the 
following chapter of the dissertation. 
Table 1 lists the energy IGOs that have been coded for design. We 
enumerate the original documents we coded and the energy-related 
provisions that led to the inclusion of the IGO in the population. For 
this coding, we considered all the energy IGOs that satisfy the criteria 
detailed above, independently from their year of creation. The coding 
was performed based on the original treaties of the IGOs. However, 
three exceptions exist – the Energy Charter, the African Union, and the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. In the cases of the 
Energy Charter and the African Union, the coding could not be carried 
out from the original treaties due to the considerable modifications that 
have been made to those treaties. The African Union is a successor of 
the Organization for African Unity (OAU), the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators is a successor of the European 
Regulators' Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), and the Energy 
Charter is a direct derivation from the European Charter Treaty. Since 
these three IGOs did not considerably change the core of their founding 
energy provisions within these revisions, we decided not to exclude 
them from the analysis. Yet, to give an account of the radical changes in 
the overall functions and organization of the IGOs, we coded the 
revised treaties. Both versions of the name are reported in the table. 
[Tables 1.a and 1.b about here] 
5. List of Energy IGOs and Individual Nation Memberships 
The list of energy IGOs above (Table 1) was used to generate a list of 
individual nation memberships. We divided our 51 years of analysis 
into five-year periods and then proceeded to ascertain the nations that 
were members of each IGO during each of the 11 periods under 
analysis. The identification of state entities that are part of the 
international system relied on already existing codes (see in particular 
Singer and Small 1966). To qualify for inclusion, a national political 
entity must have standard characteristics of national sovereignty, a 
population of more than half million people and be recognized by the 
United Nations as a state, as understood by international law and 
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practice. Application of these criteria results in a population that ranges 
from 152 states in 1950 to 170 in 2011. 
We next verify if the nation qualifies for membership in a given 
energy IGO. Nations have to meet three criteria. First, the nation has to 
nominate a representative delegation to the IGO. This delegation must 
have full voting rights, regardless of the voting system. Second, the 
nation's delegation must actively participate in the activities of the IGO, 
i.e., it must not miss more than two plenary sessions in a row. If the 
delegation fails to attend three consecutive general meetings, we 
consider its membership expired, even if the IGO or the nation 
concerned still considers the membership valid. This is because, we are 
interested in the actual participation of nations to the life of the 
organizations rather than their legal condition. Finally, we do not 
account for delegations that represent territorial entities that are not 
recognized as states. 
We decided to pick the five-year cluster to balance between 
accuracy of the data and a sufficient precision in determining the 
nations' IGOs membership. For some energy IGOs it was in fact 
difficult to ascertain the exact participation of countries in all general 
assemblies. At the same time, a five-year period seemed to be brief 
enough to make sure not to lose any significant change in time for 
IGOs' composition. Clearly, if a nation quit an organization during one 
of these half-decade periods, its membership is withdrawn only at the 
end of the period. The limitation of this approach is that figures derived 
from this analysis cannot be interpreted as a representation of existing 
nation memberships at any period in time, but may include expired 
memberships. 
In graph 1 we show the active nation memberships held by each 
nation in the system for all our 13 periods. Graph 1 covers the period 
from 1960 to 2010. Graph 1 offers an overview of the IGOs' membership 
distribution throughout the global system, on a state-by-state basis.  
[Graph 1 about here] 
While compiling this membership index, we noticed that energy 
IGOs did not experience any significant turnover in their evolution. 
That is, the IGO population changed through time but most IGOs did 
not experience much change in their internal composition. We therefore 
determined that including a measure for change would be appropriate 
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to provide a sense of the evolution in the energy IGO population. Table 
2, columns 1 to 4, systematizes these results both in absolute and 
percentage changes. The IGO net change, i.e. the number of IGOs 
created minus the amount of IGOs eliminated from the system, is a 
concrete measure of the constant increase in the number of IGOs 
dealing with energy issues during our period of analysis. 
[Table 2 about here] 
The IGO population percentage change is more sensitive as it 
focuses on the size of changes. We note that the increase in the energy 
IGO population happens gradually throughout the most part of the 
periods considered. The two noticeable exceptions are in the 1990 and 
2000 periods, where we have a sudden increase in the number of 
energy IGOs. These fluctuations can be explained by two main 
international relations determinants. First, at the beginning of the 1990s 
a number of regional economic and free trade agreements were signed, 
which included relevant energy provisions. Some of the major free 
trade agreements signed during this period included the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA), the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), and the 
European Union (EU) (Findlay and Urata 2010). These free trade 
agreements all created new multilateral trade arrangements, or 
extended previously existing trade arrangements, and reduced the 
scope of trade limitations in the area (Findlay and Urata 2010). Also 
significant during this period was the formalization of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). The WTO, which was formalized as a 
replacement for the previous General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1995, plays a significant role in the energy trade as well as in 
the formulation of economic structures that the energy trade must 
account for (Selinova, 2011). These free trade agreements and others all 
resulted in an increase in the need to arrange regional cooperation and 
cooperation between trading partners specifically focused on the 
development of energy resources. Thus, the introduction of these 
multilateral free trade agreements resulted in the need for new IGOs.  
The flowering of free trade around the world was not isolated in its 
effect on the formation of energy IGOs. The dissolution of Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union had brought many energy-rich new countries to 
stage, creating a double effect. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led 
to the devolvement of statehood to its 15 component states (Sakwa, 
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1999). These states included Georgia and Russia, as well as the Caspian 
states many of which now are major oil producing countries. This does 
not suggest that the development of these new states actually increased 
the amount of oil or the associated international cooperation associated 
with them. The Soviet Union was already a major world oil producer 
and supplier by the 1960s, supplying European and Middle Eastern 
markets from its extensive reserves (Stent, 2003). Stent (2003) estimates 
that by 1965, the Soviet Union was producing 1,020,000 barrels/day of 
crude oil, or around 4% of the world supply. At the peak of Soviet oil 
production in 1987, the Soviet Union was producing 624 million tons of 
oil (including crude and refined products), most of it from the Russian 
Federation (Vatansever 2010). With consumption of just under 250 
million tons, this made the Soviet Union the world leader in oil 
production. While energy production in the Soviet Union had dropped 
by 1990-1991, it still represented about 40% of the state‘s convertible 
currency trade, with most exports going to OECD countries, the 
Eastern European bloc, and non-aligned countries including India and 
Cuba (IMF/OECD 1991). There was also significant energy production 
and cooperation in the former Yugoslavia. For example, the JANAF 
pipeline, which moved oil from refineries at Omišalj north into 
Yugoslavia, had come online by 1979 (Marušić 2012). Rather, the main 
change that prompted the change in energy IGO formation was the 
scramble for new political alliances with these states.  
Existing countries tried on one side to reinforce their position face 
this period of uncertainty through a renewed set of economic alliances 
that could guarantee their energy commerce. One example of such a 
new-formed alliance is the 1997 strategic alliance between Turkey and 
the United States, which was focused on energy strategy (Hill 2004). 
Hill (2004) notes that this trading relationship was not based on 
physical connections, e.g. pipelines. Instead, it was based on an 
assessment by the US that Turkey served as a strategic foothold in the 
increasingly important Caspian region, offering it access to the newly 
opened Caspian states and their energy resources. The main outcome 
of this alliance was the construction of more efficient methods of 
transporting Caspian oil resources through Turkey to the world market 
(Hill 2004). Previous trading relationships also fell apart, based on the 
former Soviet Union‘s sudden demand for market prices for its oil from 
previously favoured trading partners. For example, Kyrgyzstan was 
forced to exploit its own dwindling oil resources after several years of 
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dependence on Soviet oil, after the former Soviet Union failed to 
honour its previous pricing schedule, making it unaffordable for 
Kyrgyzstan to supply its energy needs (Abazov 2002). The rapid 
change in the economic and trade relationships, particularly between 
former Soviet republics and the rest of the world, necessitated the 
expansion of energy NGOs because of the number of new countries 
involved in the world energy market directly as well as the change in 
political connections and increasing importance of markets to major 
producer like the former Soviet republics.  
During this period, there was also a drive to create a normative 
linkage with these new countries. The use of normative pressures as a 
means of promoting international relationships and compliance with 
an accepted standard of state behaviour is relatively well accepted 
within the theoretical basis of international relations (Koivosto 2012). 
Normative state power can also be enacted at the international level. 
One clear example of this was the post-Cold War expansion of the EU 
to include states that formerly were part of the Soviet Union or 
Yugoslavia or independent states within the Soviet bloc (Sajdik and 
Schwarzinger 2008). The accession of these states actually happened 
between 2004 and 2007 (including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia in 
the first round and Bulgaria and Romania in the second round) (Sajdik 
and Schwarzinger 2008). However, the groundwork for normative 
relationships with the states in question actually began during the 
1980s, with opening of trade with independent states as well as 
expansion of trade with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.  
Energy trade had already been established between the Soviet 
Union and the states of the nascent European Union, with pipelines 
carrying significant amounts of oil between these regions (IMF/OECD 
1991). The process of EU accession added further components of 
normative pressure to the reformation of energy relationships with the 
new states. For example, EU accession rules under the Copenhagen 
criteria require ‗the existence of a functioning market economy as well 
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces 
within the union‘ (Copenhagen European Council 1993). These rules, 
which were put into place specifically to handle the possibility of 
accession by Eastern European economies previously falling under the 
aegis of the Soviet Union, were operationalized in a series of specific 
guidelines and requirements about economic performance and trade 
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(Sajdik and Schwarzinger 2008). In many cases, the main area where 
these former Soviet states could fall back was on their energy 
production capabilities, leading to the potential for formation of new 
energy NGOs due to the expansion of market capacity. Thus, even 
though formal EU accession by this group of countries did not occur 
until the first half of the 2000s, the processes and pressures that would 
lead to this accession, which included energy concerns, were already 
well underway by the early 1990s.  
 Finally, in the first years of the 2000s, the global political system 
experienced a flourishing of global energy initiatives that concentrated 
on two main items, including connecting national regulatory agencies 
within a regional framework and increasing the global transparency on 
energy data and processes. One example of such an initiative is the 
twin energy regulation organizations of the EU, the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the Council of 
European Energy Regulators (CEER) (CEER 2012). CEER was founded 
in 2000 as a voluntary cooperative organization for European energy 
regulation groups, while ACER is the successor to the European 
Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), formed as a formal 
European Commission advisory group in 2003 (CEER 2012). ACER 
became operational in 2011, taking on some of the responsibilities of 
ERGEG while others passed to CEER. Although their structure is 
slightly different, both organizations work to improve energy market 
efficiency and transparency across the EU, as well as supporting 
consumer initiatives and requirements in this area (CEER 2012). It is 
easy to see how initiatives of this type would support the development 
of new energy NGOs, as this type of regional cooperation is specifically 
the type of interaction that an NGO is designed for. 
6. Weighted Nation Memberships 
At this stage of the analysis, we felt it was necessary to move from 
counting the absolute number of IGOs and their members to a 
weighted measure of the different stages of centrality of energy IGOs in 
the different five-year periods considered in this analysis. For this 
purpose, we evaluated which energy-related measure could better 
represent a measure of the relevance of energy IGOs.  First, we 
established that this measurement should be effectuated at a state level. 
Then, we considered that, for the scope of our work, it would have 
been useful to rely on a trade measure of the centrality of states in the 
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world energy market. In order to define this centrality, we posited that 
the amount of energy traded by each state (both bought and sold) could 
represent an adequate gauge of its centrality in the global energy 
market. This assumption is based on an understanding of the global 
energy market and the importance of international trade within this 
market, as well as the basic aspects of supply and demand 
(Bhattacharyya 2011). Although there are alternative measures that 
could be used, these do not necessarily reflect the same importance on 
the international stage. For example, one common measure is the ratio of 
production to exports (Bhattacharyya 2011). However, this figure 
reflects the importance of the energy trade to the internal economy, not 
the importance of the state to the global energy trade. In essence, by 
selecting total demand and supply of energy as a measure, it is possible 
to determine how important the state is in aggregate as a supplier, 
buyer, or both on the world market.  From that state-level measure, we 
could then move to calculate the centrality of energy IGOs, on the basis 
of their member states‘ composition. 
In order to determine this scope, we relied on the COMTRADE 
dataset. This dataset has been created by the United Nations, and 
provides free information and data on International Merchandise Trade 
Statistics (IMTS) and the work of the International Merchandise Trade 
Statistics Section (IMTSS) of the United Nations Statistics Division 
(UNSD). Specifically, we were interested in the two sectors related to 
oil and gas trade: sector 33, which comprises petroleum, petroleum 
products and related material; sector 34, which concerns gas, natural 
and manufactured. Both sectors were considered under Standard 
International Trade Classification revision 3. The value of data is 
expressed in dollars, thus measuring the value of trade rather than its 
volume. This is useful because it serves to reflect the changing value of 
energy commodities over time.  
COMTRADE is one of the most comprehensive databases available 
for this commercial data, as well as one of the most regularly updated. 
However, it has limitations that affected our analysis.1 Particularly, 
many countries do not provide data for each year. All COMTRADE 
data on oil and gas starts in 1969, and are not available for oil and gas 
commerce antecedent to that year. No data were available at any 
                                                                
1 A comprehensive disclaimer on COMTRADE can be found on the following webpage: 
http://comtrade.un.org/db/help/uReadMeFirst.aspx.  
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period of time for Equatorial Guinea, Taiwan, South Sudan, Uzbekistan 
and the Soviet Union. This does not necessarily mean that these 
countries were not producing or consuming oil, of course. For example, 
the Soviet Union was one of the leading oil producers in the world 
prior to its 1991 dissolution, with a contribution of Uzbekistan 
(IMF/OECD 1991). South Sudan has only been recognized as an 
independent state following its January 2011 referendum on 
independence from Sudan and subsequent admission to the United 
Nations (UN News 2011). Reasons for unavailability of Taiwan and 
Equatorial Guinea data are unknown.  Data became available after 1989 
during most years for Russia and the other former Soviet Union states. 
Although this gap meant that our analysis suffered of constraints in 
time and space, we considered available data to be sufficient in number 
and quality to allow us to pursue our analysis. These types of gaps are 
commonplace in time series and panel data analysis, and as long as 
they are not extensive do not significantly bias the outcomes of the 
analysis (Tinbergen 2007).  
Once we acquired data, we moved to the calculation of states‘ 
scores. For each state, we summed the money value of bought and sold 
energy in every of the five-year periods considered in our analysis. 
When data was missing, we used the value of zero for that specific year 
and state. The procedure we followed to assign a score was the 
following. We divided the total energy trade of the five-year period by 
the total energy trade of the five-year period of the single state. We then 
obtained the state‘s percentage of energy traded out of the overall 
world total. Subsequently, we compiled a state-based classification for 
each five-year period of our analysis. States at the top of the 
classification changed through the different periods. However, there 
was some variability through time in the top five states. This variability 
is consistent with the changing industrial and lifestyle needs and 
energy production of countries around the world. One example of the 
type of changes that have occurred over this period is the rapid 
industrialization and increase in consumption in the People‘s Republic 
of China since the early 1980s, which positioned China as the second-
highest energy consumer in the world by 2003 (Crompton and Wu 
2005). There have been movements in the other direction as well, as 
countries increased their energy independence through development of 
renewable and internal resources. For example, Denmark, already a net 
energy exporter due to North Sea oil and gas deposits, has recently 
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committed to supplying 50% of its internal energy consumption 
through wind energy by 2020 (Danish Ministry of Climate, Energy and 
Building 2012). However, these are relatively new initiatives on the 
scale of the research and it is unlikely that they have moved countries 
out of the top spots as of yet.  
[Graph 3 about here] 
Graph 3 shows the difference between simple and weighted 
memberships through time. We observe that at the beginning the two 
tend to correspond, while in the 1990s differentiation starts to 
constantly increase, leading simple membership to grow much faster 
than weighted membership. This outcome can be explained by the fact 
that, at the beginning of our investigation period, top-level consumer 
and producer states were the first states to enter one or more energy 
IGOs. This move makes sense, as strategic interests related to energy 
were stronger for them than for other states. Thus, in the first five-year 
periods, the simple membership, i.e., the number of states in the energy 
IGO system roughly corresponded to the weighted membership, i.e., 
the economic weight of states (their oil and gas purchases and sells) in 
the energy IGO system. However, during time a number of energy 
IGOs emerged. The strongest energy buyers or sellers did not compose 
these IGOs, but rather they had a universalistic aim, or were based on 
regional involvement. Thus, they also involved many states that 
represented small percentages of the global energy commerce. As a 
consequence, the absolute number of states in the energy IGOs system 
increased much faster than their weighted membership.  
This tendency can also be explained by the necessity for energy 
IGOs to obtain as much political backup as possible for their initiatives, 
which require enlarging their membership to additional (though less 
energy-powerful) states. Although this is not an explicitly stated goal of 
any energy IGOs that we could find, it is consistent with a normative 
theory of state relations, in which a larger number of states supporting 
a given choice of policies is more likely to be seen as accepted (Koivosto 
2012). It is also consistent with the formation of other types of IGOs 
such as the WTO, which has driven regulation of energy through the 
larger trade organizations (Selinova 2011). 
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7. Weighting Energy IGOs 
After weighting states for all the periods considered in our analysis, 
we moved to sum states‘ memberships in order to evaluate the weight 
of energy IGOs. In table 2, column 5, we summarized the data at our 
disposal for energy IGOs.  
[Table 2 about here] 
As we had already noticed, the number of IGOs has been steadily 
increasing through time, with considerable advancements in the 1970s, 
the 1990s, and the 2000s. Simple and weighted memberships have been 
also increasing, as states developed multiple memberships in different 
organizations. However, graph 2 shows that the top five organizations 
displayed a reduced variability through time, especially for the first 
two positions.  
[Graph 2 about here] 
As a trend, it can nonetheless be noticed that consumer IGOs have 
increased while producer IGOs have reduced their presence. This is 
consistent with the growth of liberalized trade and free market 
regulations, which are behind many of the challenges to energy 
security, like rising energy prices and supply constraints (Barton 2004). 
As Kyrgyzstan‘s experience with the Russian Federation following the 
dissolution of the European Union shows, consumer countries are 
considerably at risk form the imposition of market rules, while 
producer countries are actually likely to benefit. This increases the 
likelihood of consumers forming protective agreements. Energy IGOs 
may also evolve in terms of their influence. For example, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) was originally very powerful, but in 
recent years has dropped in its position. The simple reason for this is 
because of the emergence of new and highly powerful consumer states, 
such as China, which is currently the second-highest energy consumer 
in the world (Crompton and Wu 2005), and which have not elected to 
become IEA members. This shows that NGOs may not remain constant 
because of changes in their membership, or even changes that do not 
occur within their membership.   
From graphs 4, we can analyse the progress of simple and weighted 
membership for all the energy IGOs.  
[Graphs 4 about here] 
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Some energy IGOs are particularly worth noticing because of their 
unusual patterns of interaction within this analysis. GECF, for instance, 
suffered a collapse in its weighted membership, which can be 
explained with a reduction of member countries‘ production of 
exported natural gas. The GECF does not use quotas or other controls 
to manage production by its member countries, although its goal is 
ultimately to encourage increases in exports and natural gas use (GECF 
2012). Thus, it cannot directly control its position within the rankings, 
as could an IGO with another structure, like OPEC. SCO weighted 
membership, on the contrary has been steadily increasing through 
time, a progress that is coherent with the growth in imports and 
exports of its main members, China and Russia. Russia, although a 
world leader in oil exports since the 1980s, was only counted within the 
data set since the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, it has been 
steadily increasing in oil production over this period of time, and today 
is one of the world‘s top oil producers (Vatansever 2010).  
Similarly, China‘s energy use has been increasing since the 1980s, 
and today it is the second-largest consumer in the world (Crompton 
and Wu 2005). Under the rankings used within this study, both 
increases in exports and increases in imports within Russia and China 
would drive SCO toward a top position in the rankings, despite its 
relatively new establishment.  On the contrary, OPEC and OAPEC‘s 
development through time testifies an evolution in their members‘ 
centrality in the global energy market. While at the beginning OPEC 
and OAPEC displayed a weighted membership higher than the simple 
one, in the 1985 period, both suffered from a steady decline in their 
weight, which rapidly stabilized itself in the next five-year period. This 
change was likely due to the global oil glut and attendant drop in 
prices during the 1980s, which was fuelled by overproduction, minor 
recessions that depressed demand, and increased efforts toward energy 
efficiency (Amuzegar 2001). This oil glut had mixed effects, driving 
many countries including Saudi Arabia to seek out price stability rather 
than higher prices (Amuzegar, 2001). However, this is reflected in our 
criteria as a drop in importance due to a drop in the price of oil during 
this period.  
Finally, there are organizations, even quite different one from the 
other in their scopes, such as OOCUR and Petrocaribe, where both 
weighted and simple memberships remained constant through time. 
OOCUR and Petrocaribe, both Caribbean-based energy IGOs, have 
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benefited from offshore production, but with small populations, low 
levels of industrial and economic development, and significant use of 
oil resources by countries including Venezuela, the actual oil exports 
and imports of the region have stayed relatively consistent over time 
(Weintraub et al. 2007). Based on these four groups, it is clear that there 
are a variety of ways in which energy IGO importance may vary. 
However, it is clear that these variations can be traced to real-world 
events and the structure of the IGO itself, rather than any substantive 
issue within the model. 
8. Conclusion 
The changing structures of global production, with transitions most 
evident since the end of World War II, have posed problems to 
traditional systems of regulation (Abbot and Snidal 2009). Energy-
focused IGOs, in essence, control the activities of economic actors 
through various systems of monitoring and enforcing. Institutions 
dependent upon IGOs as well as member-states of IGOs are core 
stakeholders in the system, with IGOs serving as the overarching actor 
that controls global production and consumption of energy. The most 
salient criteria for inclusion in this study were the energy-focused 
agenda of the IGO, with the unique role of energy in the global 
marketplace rationalizing the need for this model.  
Dimensions of membership, coordinated oligopolistic systems, aid 
in energy shortage events, control power, scope, structure, 
centralization, and flexibility all informed the coding scheme for 
classifying the identified IGOs. The five-year clusters used for the 
temporal context of examination between the years of 1945 and 2011 
highlighted visible changes in the number and nature of IGOs over 
time. Substantial and unprecedented advancements during the 1970s, 
1990s, and 2000s, in particular, were noted, with memberships 
increasing and multiple memberships developed over time. A salient 
conclusion of the study is that while the overall number of IGOs has 
increased over time, the number of consumer IGOs has increased while 
producer IGOs have decreased in prevalence; this is at least partially 
attributable to the environmental realities of energy security, including 
supply restrictions and escalating prices.  
Visible trends reflected in the model also include underlying goals 
of regional integration and involvement, rather than strong tendencies 
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toward consumption or production, alone. In essence, these IGOs 
embodied an overarching aim of interconnectivity, involving many 
nation-states that had conversely small percentages of global energy 
trade; this was not indicative of weighted membership but a higher 
quantity in member-state participation. At the crux of this trend is the 
overlap between the political and economic spheres of the global 
community, as IGOs acted out of a political necessity to achieve 
economic outcomes; they needed to garner political clout in order to 
achieve their goals. Such trends are indicative of the need filled by 
IGOs for individual member-states that have little global influence on 
the energy sector when acting as isolated entities. When bound to an 
IGO, however, these states wield far more power through collective 
action. The external force of diminishing nation-state power partially 
informs these trends, with alliances between energy-poor states with 
limited global power emerging from environmental factors.  
Divergence between consistent membership and escalating 
influence can be attributed to these same external factors, including 
large-scale events and other transitions in the social, economic, and 
political spheres. Consequently, it is concluded that the validity of the 
model stands as discrepancies can be linked to alternative forces not 
bound to the IGO itself. The classification system articulated herein 
represents a much-needed model for highlighting IGOs‘ evolution over 
the time period in which the global marketplace became most 
interconnected, with energy trade concurrently and exponentially 
increasing. The role of energy in shaping multiple dimensions in the 
global community is a prominent one, and IGOs have become a key 
actor in regulating energy movements. This work has articulated a 
quantitative model for classifying IGOs between the years of 1945 and 
2011, drawing key conclusions regarding the ebbs and flows in IGO 
quantity and influence. The diversity in IGOs as well as visible trends 
are indicative of unprecedented transitions in the global marketplace 
during this timeframe, with the increased focus on energy concurrently 
reflecting the increasing fluidity in movement of one of the most 
valuable, globally traded commodities.  
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Appendix to Chapter 1 
 
 
TABLE 1.a: List of Energy IGOs  
Name Acronym Year of 
Creation 
Documents Coded Founding 
Energy 
Provisions 
Africa--EU 
Energy 
Partnership 
AEEP 2007 Communication from the 
Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, 
From Cairo to Lisbon, The EU--
Africa Strategic Partnership, 
COM(2007) 357 Final 
Provision 
3.2.a 
African 
Forum for 
Utility 
Regulators 
AFUR 2002 Constitution of the African 
Forum for Utility Regulators; 
About Afur: The African Forum 
for Utility Regulators 
Article 4 of 
the 
Constitution; 
p. 6 of About 
Afur 
African 
Petroleum 
Producers 
Association 
APPA 1987 Agreement Establishing the 
African Petroleum Producers' 
Association 
Article 3 
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Asia-
Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperatio
n (Energy 
Working 
Group) 
APEC 1989 There is no APEC statute or 
treaty or agreement so to speak. 
APEC is not a rules-based 
organization.  Instead it works on 
the basis of consultation and 
consensus building.  New 
policies decided within APEC 
meetings are agreed to 
voluntarily.  Key documents 
include Leaders' Declarations, 
Ministerial Statements, and 
Meeting Reports. The coding was 
done on the First Ministerial 
Meeting (Canberra, Australia, 
November 6--7, 1989), the Second 
Ministerial Meeting (Singapore, 
July 29--31, 1990) and on the 
website section ``How APEC 
Operates'' of www.apec.org 
Specific 
Element of a 
Work 
Program D 
of the First 
Ministerial 
Meeting; 
Work Project 
E of the 
Second 
Ministerial 
Meeting 
Asociacion 
Iberoameri
cana de 
Entidades 
Reguladora
s de la 
Energia 
ARIAE 2000 Estatutos Articulo 2 
Association 
of 
Southeast 
Asian 
Nations 
ASEAN 1976 While ASEAN was established in 
1967, the ASEAN Secretariat was 
created in 1976. According to our 
rules, the design coding was 
done once the secretariat was in 
place. The coding was done on 
the Agreement on the 
Establishment of the ASEAN 
Secretariat and the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord (Bali, February 
24, 1976) 
Section B of 
the 
Declaration 
of ASEAN 
Concord 
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Baltic Sea 
Region 
Energy 
Cooperatio
n 
BASREC 1995 First Meeting of the CBSS Energy 
Ministers (Stavanger, November 
30--December 1, 1998) 
Challenge 
section 
Black Sea 
Regional 
Energy 
Centre 
BSREC 1999 Communication from the 
Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, 
Black Sea Synergy: A New 
Regional Cooperation Initiative 
Part 3: The 
Main 
Cooperation 
Areas 
Central 
European 
Initiative 
CEI 1996 While CEI was established in 
1989, the CEI Secretariat was 
created in 1996. According to our 
rules, the design coding was 
done once the secretariat was in 
place. The coding was done on 
the Central European Initiative 
Guidelines and Rules of 
Procedures 
Section I.6 
East Asia 
and Pacific 
Infrastruct
ure 
Regulatory 
Forum 
EAPIRF 2003 EAPIRF Constitution Article 4 
Energy 
Communit
y 
EnC 2006 Treaty establishing the Energy 
Community 
Articles 2 
and 3 
Energy 
Regulators 
Regional 
Association 
ERRA 2000 Constitution Article II 
European 
Energy 
Charter/En
ergy 
Charter 
EC 1991 The Energy Charter Treaty and 
Related Documents 
Article 2 
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European 
Regulators' 
Group for 
Electricity 
and 
Gas/Agenc
y for the 
Cooperatio
n of Energy 
Regulators 
ERGEG 2003 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of 
the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators 
Article 1 
Extractive 
Industries 
Transparen
cy 
Initiative 
EITI 2003 EITI Constituency Guidelines 
and EITI Rules (2007 Version) 
EITI 
Principles 
and Criteria 
of the EITI 
Rules 
Gas 
Exporting 
Countries 
Forum 
GECF 2001 GECF Charter and GECF 
Agreement 
Objectives of 
the GECF 
Charter 
Gulf 
Cooperatio
n Council 
GCC 1981 Charter Article Four 
Internation
al Atomic 
Energy 
Agency 
IAEA 1957 Statute Articles II 
and III 
Internation
al Energy 
Agency 
IEA 1974 Agreement and Decision on an 
International Energy Program 
(November 18, 1974) 
Article 2 
Internation
al Energy 
Forum 
IEF 2001 Statute of the International 
Energy Forum 
Chapter 1: 
Organization 
and 
Objectives 
Internation
al 
Partnership 
for Energy 
Efficiency 
Cooperatio
n 
IPEEC 2008 Terms of Reference for the 
International Partnership for 
Energy Efficiency Cooperation 
Points 1 and 
2 
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Latin 
American 
Energy 
Organizati
on 
OLADE 1973 Convenio de Lima Articulo 3 
Mediterran
ean Gas 
and Energy 
Regulators 
Assembly 
MEDREG 2007 Statutes Articles 3 
and 4 
MERCOSU
R 
MERCOS
UR 
1991 Tratado para la Constitucion de 
un Mercado Comun and 
Decisiones del Consejo del 
Mercado Comun 
Subgrupo de 
Trabajo n. 9 
of Decisiones 
del Consejo 
del Mercado 
Comun 
North 
American 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
NAFTA 1994 North America Free Trade 
Agreement 
Chapter Six 
Organizati
on for 
African 
Unity/Afric
an Union 
AU 1963 Constitutive Act Articles 13 
and 14 
Organizati
on of Arab 
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Countries 
OAPEC 1968 Agreement of the Organization of 
Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries 
Article Two 
Organizati
on of 
Caribbean 
Utility 
Regulators 
OOCUR 2002 Agreement Sections 1 
and 2 
Organizati
on of the 
Black Sea 
Economic 
Cooperatio
n 
BSEC 1999 Charter of the Organization of 
the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation 
Article 4 
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Organizati
on of the 
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Countries 
OPEC 1961 OPEC Statute Chapter 1 
Petrocaribe PC 2005 Estatutos Petrocaribe Articulo 2 
Regional 
Electricity 
Regulators 
Association 
RERA 2002 Constitution of the Regional 
Electricity Regulators Association 
of the Southern Africa 
Development Community 
Article 4 
Shanghai 
Cooperatio
n 
Organisatio
n 
SCO 2001 Declaration on the Establishment 
of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation and Charter of the 
Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation 
Point 2 of the 
Establishmen
t of the 
Shanghai 
Cooperation 
Organisation 
and articles 1 
and 3 of the 
Charter of 
the Shanghai 
Cooperation 
Organisation 
South-
Asian 
Forum for 
Infrastruct
ure 
Regulation 
SAFIR 1999 SAFIR Statute Objectives 
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TABLE 1.b: List of Questions Concerning IGO Design  
 
Variable  Abbreviation  Question and Possible Answers 
Membership  memb  
What are the requirements to join the 
organization?   
 
  Open  
 
  Open with requirements  
    Closed 
Coordinated 
oligopolistic system  
cartlev  
What is the level of coordination of the 
oligopoly? 
 
  No oligopoly 
 
  
Potential oligopoly (i.e., expressed 
interest in influencing the market)  
 
  Matter of fact oligopoly  
 
carttyp  
What is the type of oligopoly: is there a 
use of the coordinated oligopoly for 
political reasons?  
 
  No oligopoly 
 
  Pure economic oligopoly 
    
Economic and security oligopoly 
(i.e., use of the oligopoly for political 
reasons) 
Aid in case of energy 
shortages  
aid  
Does the organization provide aid in 
case of energy shocks? 
 
  No 
 
  Yes, requires the approval of states 
    Yes, directly applicable by the IGOs 
Control power  cont  What kind of vote,   
 
  if any, is necessary to pass decisions?  
 
  No control power applicable 
 
  Majority vote required 
 
  Qualified majority vote required 
 
  
Unanimous vote 
required/Possibility of veto 
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    IGOs can directly sanction states 
Scope  scope  
Which energy sources are included in 
the IGO's domain? 
 
  
Some energy matters are included 
(i.e., only some energy sources, only 
a segment of the market, etc.) 
    
All energy matters can be 
potentially covered 
Structure  meet  
How structured are the working bodies 
of the organization?  
 
  
Meetings for discussion (no working 
groups) 
 
  
Ad hoc/task force groups (which 
end after performing their duties) 
 
  Permanent groups 
 
staff  
What kind of staff does the organization 
employ?  
 
  Staff borrowed from member states 
 
  Shared staff among groups 
    Dedicated staff for each group 
Centralization of 
design  
design  What is the level of constraint that   
 
   the organization can   
 
  impose on member states? 
 
  Collect and diffuse information 
 
  Release evaluations 
 
  Release recommendations 
    Directly impose decisions on states 
Flexibility  flexadap  Is it possible to derogate to rules?  
 
  Derogation to rules impossibile 
 
  Derogation to rules possible 
 
flextrans  
Is it possible to renegotiate the IGO's 
treaty?  
 
  Renegotiation impossible 
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Renegotiation possible, every five--
ten years or more frequently 
 
  
Renegotiation possible, every ten--
twenty years 
    
Renegotiation possible, every 
twenty years or less frequently 
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GRAPH 1: Number of Energy IGOs Membership by Nation for Each 
Period 
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TABLE 2: IGOs Changes For Each Period 
 
1. Year 
2. 
Number 
of IGOs 
3. Number of 
IGOs -
Percentange 
Changes 
4. Simple 
Memberships 
5. Weighted 
Memberships 
1965 4   144 1.42 
1970 6 33% 207 2.11 
1975 7 14% 221 2.20 
1980 8 13% 232 2.25 
1985 11 27% 259 2.50 
1990 16 31% 356 3.48 
1995 18 11% 400 3.50 
2000 28 36% 639 5.17 
2005 34 18% 810 6.48 
2010 34 0% 813 6.60 
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GRAPH 2: Top-5 Energy IGOs for Each Period 
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GRAPH 3: Energy IGOs Simple and Weighted Memberships - 
Collective Evolutionary Data 
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GRAPHS 4: Energy IGOs Simple and Weighted Memberships - 
Evolutionary Data for Each Organization 
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Energy IGOs: Alliance, Membership and Infrastructure 
1. Introduction 
Energy security is increasingly one of the major concerns of 
international relations and international alliance formation. Yergin 
(2006) points to the emergence of energy security as a concern to the 
beginning of World War I and Winston Churchill‘s decision to move 
from coal-fired ships to oil-fired ships. Although this gained some 
tactical advantages, it left the United Kingdom open to shortages of oil, 
making oil an issue of national security for the first time. However, it 
was not until the 1973 oil embargo that energy security became a major 
byword of international relations as well as internal strategic 
positioning (Yergin, 2006). Energy security during this period led to the 
establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) as well as other 
transnational energy concerns, representing one of the first true 
transnational political structures (Keohane, 1978). During the 1970s and 
1980s, energy security was considered solely in terms of availability 
and supply of oil, and the main issues were international conflict and 
uncertain international alliances (Yergin, 2006). Based on the need to 
control sufficient energy supplies, international alliances were created 
that specifically addressed oil access.  
Although energy security is as important as ever was in the arena of 
international politics, this does not mean that concerns have not 
changed. One of the biggest changes is the gradual awareness of peak 
oil, or the point at which the world‘s oil production will begin to fall 
due to reduced availability and increased difficulty in extraction (Bardi, 
2009). Bardi (2009) notes that it is difficult to predict when peak oil will 
occurs, although it is expected to be within the first few decades of the 
21st century. He also notes that some analyses suggest that peak oil 
occurred in 2005 or 2006, and thus oil production is already on the 
downturn (Bardi, 2009). The idea of peak oil is particularly important 
for energy security because of the embedding of oil in the energy and 
transport infrastructure of almost all countries. Yergin (2006) argues 
that the occurrence of peak oil has resulted in a need to find other 
sources of energy to overcome future energy scarcity. This has had a 
significant influence on national energy security strategies. Another 
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concern is that of anthropogenic climate change, which has also 
induced changes in energy provision.  
Although some progress has been made in developing new forms of 
energy and new energy production technologies, this process has been 
uncertain. A recent report from the International Energy Agency 
indicated that although significant progress had been made on 
developing alternative energy technologies, there was still a great deal 
of effort required to meet the requirements of a growing world (IEA, 
2012b). This report pointed to the development of alternative energy 
strategies as important for both cost-saving measures and climate 
change mitigation measures. It indicated that each dollar spent on 
alternative energy investments would save three dollars by 2050 
through avoidance of increasingly expensive fossil fuels (IEA, 2012b). 
Regardless, the development of alternative energy technologies has 
stagnated, with research and development funding actually falling 
since the 1980s and lack of deployment of highly promising 
technologies like offshore wind and concentrated solar power (IEA, 
2012b). This trend in development and utilization of energy 
technologies runs counter to the availability trend for fossil fuels. Thus, 
the failure to develop alternative fuels is likely to exert an increasing 
strain on energy security. 
Nations use a number of approaches to energy security during the 
current period. One of the approaches commonly used by these nations 
is the formation of alliances around common energy interests. The 
formation of energy alliances is a strategic approach, with relationships 
formed between alliance partners based on their perceived importance 
to internal energy considerations (Dorussen, 2006). This is similar to 
many other forms of international trade and structural alliance, where 
priority is commonly given to strategically important alliance partners 
(Dorussen, 2006). Energy alliances are often formed along the same 
lines as existing trade alliances, and may share priority in terms of 
trading partners. However, energy alliances may also be formed based 
on shared energy security concerns, rather than strictly trade concerns, 
setting them apart from simple economic motivations. However, these 
agreements may conflict with issues of state sovereignty or 
independence, which can serve as a negative factor in international 
cooperation agreements generally (Kroll, 1993). For example, IGOs are 
known to have significant coercive power over member operations, 
and to lead to the formation of norms and rules that may limit the 
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actions that can be taken by the IGO (Archer, 2012; Cao, 2009). This 
could be particularly true for state dyads with existing military or 
political conflict (Boehmer & Nordstrom, 2008). Thus, there is no 
guarantee that even in cases where there are shared energy interests, 
the formation of an IGO will be successful.  
In this paper, we will discuss the formation of energy alliances as 
motivated by shared energy security concerns. It proposes that shared 
energy security concerns are the prompting factor in international 
energy alliances, including state membership in energy IGOs and the 
construction of common energy infrastructure. To explore these 
propositions, the paper uses two qualitative, analytical case studies. 
These case studies include the International Energy Agency (IEA) and 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). These two cases show 
that the formation of energy alliances is not dependent on existing 
trade ties (although it may often follow these existing trade ties). 
Instead, it is based on shared energy security issues within a region or a 
group of nations, along with shared infrastructure development needs.  
2. Literature Review 
Energy security is not a fixed quantity, and often cannot be 
measured directly. As Valentine (2011) points out, issues such as the 
scope of energy security, the time horizon it is analysed at, and the 
assumptions made in the analysis change the assessment of how much 
energy, or of what type, is required to achieve energy security. 
Although there are a variety of measurements and scales available, 
many of these measurements have biases in one direction or the other 
(Valentine, 2011). Valentine (2011) provides the example of the 
Shannon Index as an indicator of energy security that is excessively 
biased to international political concerns. However, he also notes that 
almost every other aggregate index of energy security suffers from a 
similar problem, with one or more political or ideological assumptions 
complicating the calculation of energy security (Valentine, 2011). 
Because of this problem, this research does not attempt to analyse in 
detail objective energy security concerns or energy reserves. Instead, it 
focuses on perceptions by governments of shared security concerns. 
Core aspects of this literature review include energy security, energy 
alliances, and IGOs. Energy security is the core vulnerability studied, 
while energy alliances (especially through IGOs) is the mechanism by 
which energy security is protected. 
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2.1 Energy Security 
Security commonly refers to economic or military security, and is 
often developed through regions of international influence (Buzan & 
Waever, 2003). The first emergence of energy security, or concerns 
regarding the safety and supply of energy sources, became tangible 
during the First World War (Yergin, 2006). However, the first 
international governmental organisations (IGOs) devoted to energy 
security did not emerge until after the 1973-1974 oil crisis, which was 
prompted by political fracturing in the Middle East, particularly in Iran 
(Keohane, 1978). The development of energy security is thus a 
relatively recent concern in international relations. The first IGO 
dedicated to energy security assurance, the IEA, was established in 
1974 in the wake of this incident and resulting worldwide oil shortages 
(Keohane, 1978). The IEA is one of the case studies profiled in this 
research, because of its long standing nature as well as the non-trade 
based impetus for its foundation.  
Empirical evidence supports the importance of security. One 
analysis of international conflict mediation between 1918 and 1988 
found that alliance partners routinely use their economic, political, or 
military ties as a mediation tool, offering intra-alliance control over the 
actions of these partners (Gelpi, 1999). This security role is relevant 
given the long-standing position of energy security as a key security 
concern that drives international relationships and trade (Deese, 1979). 
Security and defence alliances between states appear to expand 
international trade as well (Gowa & Mansfield, 1993). Gowa and 
Mansfield‘s (1993) analysis of international trade from 1905-1985 found 
that defence alliances led to trade alliances and open trade, and that 
these effects were strongest in bilateral trade flows. Thus, the empirical 
evidence suggests that energy alliances improve trade between alliance 
partners, even though they may not be explicitly undertaken with this 
goal in mind.    
2.1.1 Energy Alliances 
Energy alliances can be understood as part of the visible framework 
of connections between states. Keohane and Nye (2011, orig. 1977), in 
their classical framework of state alliances and interactions, presented a 
framework for understanding this type of interaction between states. 
This framework indicates that state power is insufficient, in and of 
itself, to ensure security or international cooperation (Keohane & Nye, 
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2011). This assumption is directly opposed to that of realism, which 
holds that state power is the primary issue and international 
cooperation or activities are secondary and only enabled by the internal 
power of the state. Rather than focusing on the singular state as the 
instrument of power, Keohane and Nye (2011) build a web of complex 
interdependence, where sensitivity, or exposure of the state to other state 
actors, and vulnerability, or the ability to react to changes made by 
states to which it is exposed, determine a state‘s actions on the 
international stage. Under this framework, it is not strictly power that 
is important, but is instead the interconnections with other states. This 
framework explicitly allows for the formation of alliances that are not 
explicitly based on trade demands, as it allows for alliances to be 
formed based on shared exposure and vulnerability. 
Alliances are known to be strategic in nature, although they may 
not, strictly speaking, be trade-based. One understanding of alliances is 
that posed by cooperation theory. Cooperation theory commonly uses 
game theory (particularly the prisoner‘s dilemma or coordination 
games) to explain international cooperation (Fearon, 1998). Fearon 
(1998) argues that both bargaining and enforcement are parts of the 
cooperation process (integrating both of these models), and that 
common strategic interests drive the cooperation effort. Cooperation 
theory also suggests that pure economic optimization is not the only 
goal of international alliances (Pollins, 1989). Instead, concerns 
including security, defence, and the economic security of partners 
needs to play a role in the decision process (Pollins, 1989). This strongly 
supports an understanding of alliances as strategic cooperation efforts 
that do not necessarily integrate trade concerns. However, the internal 
strategic goals of a given state may not be entirely free from influences 
of external economic ties (Papayoanou, 1997). This means that energy 
alliances are likely to have economic implications and entanglements, 
even if they do not simply follow existing trade arrangements. 
A case study of energy alliances undertaken by France following the 
1973 oil crisis illustrates the importance of the alliance to energy 
security (Lieber, 1980). This case study notes that France‘s rapid 
economic development during the 1950s and 1960s significantly 
increased its energy demands. Between 1960 and 1970, imported oil 
shifted from meeting 28% of France‘s energy requirements to 67.6% of 
those requirements, despite a dramatic increase in energy requirements 
during this period. Imported energy met 76% of France‘s energy needs 
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by 1973, leading to significant economic stress following the oil 
embargo and subsequent oil crisis in the same year. France reacted to 
this sudden incursion into its energy security using two paths, 
including foreign policy changes and energy technology development, 
especially development of nuclear energy. The extent to which it 
accomplished reduction in energy dependency through this approach 
is debateable, given that the first six years of the energy development 
program resulted in only a 2% drop in the extent of its foreign energy 
dependency. France‘s second strategy was to seek out bilateral 
agreements with Arab states for oil supplies, but this proved to be not 
much more successful. Despite even rejecting European Economic 
Community (EEC) agreements in favour of these bilateral movements, 
France realized little in the way of improved oil availability or price. 
Based on this initial lack of success, France moved to an alliance-based 
approach, after ―the realization that France, as in so many other areas, 
could not resolve a major problem of international politics or 
economics by her own external actions…nor by external choices 
(Lieber, 1980, p.153).‖ This realization is consistent with the framework 
of Keohane and Nye (2011), who pose that complex interdependencies 
reduce the chance of success, or in some cases preclude it, for unilateral 
actions.  This was further shown by the failure of US-European 
relations, as the US attempted unilateral action by subsidizing oil 
imports (Lieber, 1980). These challenges represent a failure of initial 
bilateral alliances, but Lieber (1980) also posit that by forcing the 
recognition of shared vulnerabilities and interests, France‘s actions and 
subsequent EEC and American conflicts led to increased cooperation in 
EEC states. Thus, the formation of a closer alliance was brought about 
by recognition of shared vulnerability and complexity, rather than 
simple alignment of economic interests.  
 Based on the literature review, the following statements can be 
made about energy alliances. First, they are formed based on shared 
interests, or under Keohane and Nye‘s (2011) framework, shared 
vulnerabilities and sensitivity to the movements of other states. Second, 
they may or may not be aligned with current trade interests. Third, 
based on the experience of France during the 1970s, they may be much 
more effective at meeting the needs of the state than direct bilateral 
agreements, which may gain the states nothing. These stylized facts 
about energy alliances will be explored in more detail within the case 
studies.  
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2.2 Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) 
One way that energy security alliances may be implemented is 
through the international governmental alliances, i.e., inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs). One reason for joining an IGO (or 
founding it) is to meet strategic goals. IGOs and other international 
organisations are founded based on the strategic interests and goals of 
member states, and are specifically designed to serve those interests 
(Koremenos et al., 2001). Krasner (1976, p. 319) identifies four key 
strategic goals, including ―political power, aggregate national income, 
economic growth, and social stability,‖ though the importance of each 
of these may vary. IGOs may be formed along existing lines of alliance, 
such as trade agreements (Snyder, 2007).  For example, economic 
alliances could be formed in order to help the state maximize Pareto 
efficiency through trade of goods (Krasner, 1976). This framework is 
contrary to much current analysis of energy security, which focuses on 
energy security as a zero-sum fight for limited and defended resources 
(Goldthau & Witte, 2009). However, this ignores issues like energy 
market reform and market forces, which mean that the state is no 
longer a significant direct actor in securing energy (Goldthau & Witte, 
2009). Thus, within the framework of complex interrelationships, the 
IGO can be seen as the formalization of an existing set of shared 
interests and vulnerabilities around which state relationships may be 
based (Keohane & Nye, 2011).  
There is contradictory evidence for whether or not energy IGO 
participation reduces conflict in other spheres or not. One examination 
of the conflict between China and the United States in Africa finds little 
opportunity for cooperation between these states generally, despite the 
relatively high level of existing economic and political cooperation in 
this arena (Austin et al., 2008). There is also a convergence effect, with 
interests and connections between IGO participants becoming more 
similar over time (Bearce & Bondanella, 2007).  This suggests that IGOs 
may reduce conflict over time. Another study of IGOs using social 
network analysis found that mutual IGO involvement had a negative 
effect on conflict, as did strategic affinity (or alignment of strategic 
goals between states) (Maoz et al., 2006). This suggests that thickened 
interrelationships between states through IGOs could reduce conflict. 
However, this reduction is far from certain. The most important point 
about IGOs is that they are not necessarily formed along existing trade 
lines (Krasner, 1976; Snyder, 2007). This suggests that there are shared 
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interests and interdependencies that are not already spelled out in 
trade agreements, which serve as a means to promote the alliance. This 
is an area the current research will explore, especially looking at energy 
security concerns and shared infrastructure development as a cause for 
energy alliance development through the IGO.  
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
The formation of energy IGOs and subsequent actions is theorized as a 
two-stage action model. During the first stage (the bargaining stage), 
states with existing political connections or agreements and shared 
energy interests negotiate between themselves, leading to the formation 
of an energy IGO with shared interests and intended to meet specific 
requirements. The second stage (the enforcement phase) involves the 
actions of states within the existing IGO, which serve to meet the needs 
of the member states to one degree or another. In this section, each of 
these phases is encapsulated in a hypothesis about how states interact. 
Each of the stages involves a policy mechanism or model through 
which the state can achieve its energy security goals within the 
framework of the IGO.  
For Hypothesis 1, a simple policy-making model is built that describes 
the relationship between the common security concerns of the state 
with other states and the joining or foundation of the energy IGO. For 
Hypothesis 2, a framework involving trust and common security 
concerns is developed to explain the co-development of shared energy 
infrastructure.  
3.1 Bargaining Phase: Common Security Concerns and the Formation 
of IGOs 
The first hypothesis of this research focuses on the bargaining 
phrase and the formation of IGOs. Bargaining can be understood as the 
process of negotiating agreements based on optimal and acceptable 
levels of agreement between states (Jönsson, 2002). As Jönsson (2002) 
notes, the bargaining process does not necessarily limit itself to the pre-
agreement phase, but may continue following the agreement as specific 
issues are ironed out. However, the majority of basic agreements, 
including the agreement to take part in the IGO or other agreement in 
the first place, occur at the stage prior to the implementation (Jönsson, 
2002). The bargaining phase is predicated not just on external 
connections between the states in the agreement, but also on the 
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internal conditions of the state and its approach to diplomatic 
agreements (Wiegand, 2011). In some cases, the bargaining phase will 
fail because of the lack of internal agreement with the goals of the IGO, 
or because of existing conflicts between states that is as yet unresolved 
(Wiegand, 2011). The bargaining stage of international agreements is 
well established as a diplomatic agreement-making process.   
The bargaining phase is the phase in which national-level interests 
become coincident and nations begin to negotiate or bargain to 
formulate IGOs. However, in order for these interests to coincide, there 
needs to be common energy concerns in place between states. To test 
the hypothesis that is stated at the end of this discussion section, a 
policy-making model of factors in IGO formation has been developed 
(shown in Figure 1). This framework posits that existing political and 
trade alliances, along with shared energy concerns, lead to the 
formation of the energy IGO. However, these forces are opposed by 
factors exerting pressure away from the formation of the IGO. These 
negative forces include the risk that the state will not be able to 
sufficiently control the direction of the IGO, and that the strategic role 
of energy and energy resources may bring it into conflict with the IGO 
and IGO partners. This framework is developed through the literature 
in the discussion below.   
 121 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Policy-making framework for Energy IGO formation, 
including influences on the IGO formation decision (Shared energy 
concerns and existing alliances)  
3.1.1 Influences on state IGO bargaining 
The two key influences that are identified that influence the decision 
to form or join the energy IGO include existing alliances (such as trade 
and political alliances) and shared energy concerns (including shared 
sensitivities and vulnerabilities, using Keohane and Nye‘s (2011) 
framework of complex interdependencies). 
 The formation of energy IGOs along the lines of existing trade and 
political alliances is well understood from the literature (Snyder, 2007). 
The formation of alliances between states is generally understood to 
reduce conflict and aggression between states and to thicken ties 
between them (Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2000). This result in an 
increased number of trade interactions through IGOs and other 
agreements based on the formation of shared IGOs, while at the same 
time, shared IGO participation also increases the amount of economic 
interaction between states (Ingram et al., 2005). There is also empirical 
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evidence that shows that economic dependence and existing alliances 
serve to increase the entrance into the IGO, while military or political 
aggression reduces the chance of entrance into a shared IGO (Boehmer 
& Nordstrom, 2008).   
There are a number of examples that can be found that support the 
role of existing trade or diplomatic relationships between states. One 
such example is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Energy 
Working Group, especially its Energy Security Initiative, which 
addresses short-term and long-term energy security concerns through 
approaches like development of energy infrastructure and renewables 
(APEC EWG, 2012). This group is based around the common informal 
agreements of APEC, following existing political and trade agreements.  
Furthermore, the APEC EWG reaches outside the Asia Pacific region, 
incorporating states such as Mexico and Chile, that have strong trade 
connections with the region, and which participate actively in the 
energy practices (Xinhua, 2008). The Energy Community (EnC), which 
extends the EU single energy market into the Baltic states, is also 
connected to existing state and regional political and trade ties between 
neighbouring regions (Energy Community, 2012). In the case of the 
EnC, the extension of an existing energy IGO served to expand 
diplomatic ties and strengthen connections within the recently 
fragmented Baltic region. The EnC would also serve to reduce 
aggression and enforce norms in a region recently in conflict, as 
suggested by Boehmer and Nordstrom (2008). These brief examples 
show that it is uncontroversial to state that existing political and trade 
ties between states will increase the likelihood of joining or forming an 
IGO together. 
The second key influence in the formation of the IGO is shared 
energy concerns, particularly shared sensitivity and vulnerability to 
international conditions. Kroll (1993) argues that vulnerability 
represents a condition of dependence, and sensitivity a condition of 
interdependence. Kroll defines interdependence as ―a case of mutual 
vulnerability, where two actors find themselves in a relationship that 
would create large costs for both of them should it break down (Kroll, 
1993, p.322).‖ This definition makes it clear that the vulnerability 
expressed within the complex interdependence model is not just 
vulnerability to external conditions, but to interactive conditions. To 
illustrate using the previous example of France in the 1970s, France and 
the rest of the EEC were both vulnerable to external oil shortages 
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caused by Middle Eastern conflict and vulnerable to internal conditions 
and shortages (Lieber, 1980). This is particularly important to 
understand, especially given the second aspect of the definition – 
sensitivity. According to Kroll, sensitivity is ―the degree to which states 
must coordinate changes in their policies (i.e., not "deviate widely") to 
achieve the sought-after benefits of those new policies (Kroll, 1993, 
p.330).‖ As Kroll (1993) notes, following Keohane and Nye (2011), 
states have varying levels of vulnerability and sensitivity, even in cases 
where their interests may be aligned qualitatively. Kroll (1993) 
quantifies this level of vulnerability and sensitivity expression as Fate 
Control and Behaviour Control. Fate Control, associated with 
vulnerability, refers to the extent to which the state actor can control the 
outcomes, while Behaviour Control, associated with sensitivity, refers 
to the extent to which the state actor can control the actions taken 
(Kroll, 1993).  
Under this framework, the twin characteristics of vulnerability and 
sensitivity, their relative strengths, and alignment, influence the 
formation or joining of the IGO.  As with the case of shared trade and 
political ties, there are numerous examples of the formation of energy 
IGOs based on vulnerability and sensitivity to energy risk. From the 
perspective of consumer countries, the Organization of the Oil 
Producing Countries (OPEC) provides an obvious example of shared 
vulnerability and sensitivity to world markets. The OPEC Statute, 
OPEC‘s governing document, explicitly recognises the shared 
vulnerability and sensitivity to world oil markets in its opening articles, 
noting that its goal is to ―devise ways and means of ensuring the 
stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to 
eliminating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations (OPEC, 2008, Art. 
2).‖ OPEC is one of the most active energy IGOs that acts in market 
operations, for example by controlling output of oil products from 
energy markets in response to market conditions (Kwiatkowski, 2012). 
From the consumer standpoint, the International Partnership for 
Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC) has a similar basis in shared 
vulnerability and sensitivity to energy markets. Points 1 and 2 of the 
IPEEC Terms of Reference (2008), which address shared concern with 
energy efficiency and devotion to improving energy efficiency and 
exchange of these energy efficiency measures, clearly suggests a shared 
vulnerability and sensitivity to energy market concerns and focus on 
measures to reduce the importance of these market concerns.  
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3.1.2 The formation of the IGO 
The formation of the IGO, as suggested in the model shown in 
Figure 1, occurs when the cooperation forces (previous alliances and 
shared energy interests) are stronger than national sovereignty 
concerns (control over the IGO and the primacy of energy security 
concerns). What is also implied in this model is that the relative 
strength and dimensions of these concerns influence the design of the 
IGO. In particular, the strength of national sovereignty concerns could 
result in a less-binding IGO, while dominance of shared energy 
concerns and existing trade alliances could result in a more-binding 
IGO. Empirical evidence does suggest that IGOs in general are 
influenced by the factors above, although the extent of importance of 
these factors may vary. It should be noted that the ideological 
principles by which energy security is measured could influence the 
formation of the IGO as well. For example, energy security 
vulnerability is measured using different criteria in the EU and US, and 
although there is some overlap these measures do reflect different 
security priorities (Gnansounou, 2011). This implies that it is not just 
aligned interests, but perception of aligned interests, which will lead to 
the formation or joining of a shared IGO.  
The final supposition of this research is that the relative strength of 
shared interests and national sovereignty concerns will influence the 
willingness to join the energy IGO or, in the case of a new IGO, its 
initial design and formation. This supposition is supported by evidence 
regarding state decisions to join IGOs in cases where there is some 
existing political or military conflict (Boehmer & Nordstrom, 2008). 
This evidence showed that states would actually join IGOs that 
included states with which they were in conflict, but that they were 
more likely to join weak or loosely structured IGOs under these 
conditions than highly structured IGOs or IGOs devoted to security 
intervention. This is also supported by the model of complex 
interdependence, which suggests that the interactions between states 
are driven by a complex web of dependence, interdependence, and 
independence (Kroll, 1993). Based on this framework, it is not 
presumed, as it has been in earlier work (Krasner, 1976), that 
interactions are entirely driven by state power, but that this has an 
oppositional role to shared interests and existing trade ties.  
In sum, our hypothesis can be put as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: Common security concerns in energy matters 
between allied states lead to joint membership and foundation of 
energy IGOs. 
It should be noted that common security concerns are necessary, but 
are not sufficient, to drive the foundation or joint membership in the 
energy IGO. This can be seen in the membership of energy IGOs that 
have not been included. For example, producer energy IGO OPEC 
excludes a number of major oil producing and exporting nations 
including the United States and Norway, despite superficially similar 
energy security concerns. Instead, members are geographically centred 
on the Middle East and Africa (OPEC, 2013). There is also the issue of 
differing perceptions and measurement of energy security and 
measurement of security concerns (Gnansounou, 2011). It is clear that 
energy security can sometimes prompt member states and applicant 
states to join the same energy IGO even in cases of economic or political 
competition in some areas (Boehmer & Nordstrom, 2008). This raises 
the question of why states should do so. One potential answer is that 
energy security concerns become overriding compared to other 
concerns, possibly through an unexpected shift in the geopolitical or 
economic status quo, which force cooperation within a group of 
countries. The organizations that are included in this research, 
including the International Energy Agency (IEA) and Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), have different levels of potential 
competition within their member states. However, both were founded 
during periods of economic uncertainty, particularly in the energy 
market. The rapid increase in cost of energy following the 1973 oil 
crisis, which spurred the foundation of the IEA, is an exceptional 
example of this type of precipitating alignment of interests (Bünsdorf, 
2004). The two organizations selected for profiling are interesting in 
that they do align interests across countries based on these 
foundational conditions.  
3.2 Enforcement Phase: Energy infrastructure 
Involvement of states with each other does not end with the IGO 
formation. Instead, states continue to act with and on each other during 
the lifetime of the IGO, a period we have chosen to call the enforcement 
stage of the IGO agreement. The enforcement stage of international 
agreements is the period in which agreements are enacted and 
developed, creating more specification of norms associated with the 
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agreements (which are usually skeletal when enacted) (Mistelis, 2010). 
This enforcement can take the form of legal requirements or 
agreements or court actions (Mistelis, 2010), but in this case a broader 
understanding of enforcement that includes voluntary action within 
the NGO‘s framework is used. Enforcement can include the formation 
of norms such as transparency and accountability, as well as the 
development of specific projects and requirements through the IGO 
(Young, 2012). As Young (2012) notes, the power of enforcement varies 
widely with the power of the IGO, as determined by both the strength 
of its individual members and the number of members involved. 
However, during all agreements that are effective there will be some 
stage of interaction (Young, 2012). 
While the first theoretical analysis examined the impetus for joining 
the IGO (or in the case of a new IGO, participating in its formation), the 
second theoretical analysis focuses on the activities of the state once 
within the IGO. This hypothesis is based on the role of trust in 
development of international states, and the idea that states that are 
more connected to each other through IGOs are likely to have 
increasingly thickened trade and interaction ties, which could include 
building common energy infrastructure, following the creation of a 
multilateral energy security framework through the IGO. This would 
be particularly likely given Hypothesis 1, which posited that common 
security concerns are major determinants in joining the IGO in the first 
place. Obviously, the decision to build some types of common energy 
infrastructure, although not all, would also be dependent on 
geographic contiguity between states. Figure 2 shows the basic 
formulation of this hypothesis. The first half of the causal chain, joining 
the IGO in the first place, is discussed in the section above. The work of 
this section is to trace a causal relationship between formation of a 
multilateral energy security framework and the development of shared 
infrastructure.   
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Figure 2: Chain of causal effects encompassed in Hypothesis 2 
 
3.2.1 The formation of a multilateral energy security framework 
The purpose of the energy IGO is typically the formulation of a 
multilateral energy security framework. This purpose is demonstrated 
by a number of examples, of which the most comprehensive is the IEA. 
The IEA was formed in order to provide shared energy technology 
development and promote energy security among its member states 
(IEA, 2012a). Whether or not this has been successful in its 
implementation is of course always open to critique. For example, the 
IEA‘s most recent report on alternative energy technology development 
shows that this area of the shared technology infrastructure is 
significantly behind (IEA, 2012b). However, this does not change the 
nature of the shared energy security framework that mandates the 
development of this technology. The development of shared security 
frameworks is also consistent with the purpose of other types of 
security IGOs, including interventionist and structural IGOs intended 
to address issues of militarized interstate and intrastate conflict 
(Boehmer & Nordstrom, 2008). One example of this type of multi-basis 
shared security IGO including energy security is the Organization for 
African Unity (African Union), which integrates shared energy security 
concerns into general security concerns, like foreign trade, food and 
water security, and humanitarian actions (African Union, 1963). In fact, 
energy concerns within the African Union are often addressed at the 
same time and in the same context as external concerns, and are often 
interventionist in nature (UNIDO, 2009). This suggests that the 
enforcement of multilateral energy frameworks may be in the context 
of other multilateral security concerns.  
3.2.2 Shared energy infrastructure projects 
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The final question for this hypothesis is why multilateral energy 
security frameworks should allow for the construction of shared energy 
infrastructure projects like oil and natural gas pipelines. The most 
superficial answer is that pipelines represent a strategic resource for 
ensuring energy supply, as well as tying states together more firmly in 
dyadic and multilateral strategic relationships (Demir, 2012). However, 
Demir (2012) argues that it is not only a power or independence 
movement on the part of states; that is, it is not just about ensuring 
supply for the destination state. Instead, it is a relationship of 
interdependence between states; while the destination state does have an 
improved supply of energy resources, the source state also has an 
ensured demand (Demir, 2012). Thus, shared energy infrastructure like 
pipelines supports the interests of both states involved in the 
relationship. It also offers one potential means of achieving energy 
security goals, although according to at least one report most OECD 
countries have not made substantial progress in this area (Sovacool & 
Brown, 2009). Thus, this kind of attainment of structured 
interdependence between countries remains an aspirational goal. 
However, there are many energy IGOs that have actively undertaken 
the development of shared energy infrastructure regardless. For 
example, the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), which 
was established in 1973, undertakes a number of shared energy 
infrastructure projects intended to extend electricity and hydropower 
generation networks across international boundaries (OLADE, 2012). 
OLADE‘s Energy Coordination activities help smooth production and 
transmission across member countries using shared energy grid 
infrastructure. This type of shared infrastructure helps to cement the 
shared energy security frameworks in a physical form.  
Transit countries, or countries through which a pipeline passes but 
does not terminate, represent a slightly different problem. One example 
of this is the Caspian Sea region (or Caspian basin), where oil 
production resources cannot be fully exploited without allowances for 
passage of pipelines through several transit countries (Bahgat, 2002). 
These transit countries sometimes have significant oil resources of their 
own, putting the interests of source and transit countries in conflict 
(Bahgat, 2002; Cohen, 2009). However, transit countries too may be 
involved in the energy IGO, particularly in cases where the IGO is a 
regional IGO. The conflict between transit states and terminal states for 
pipelines can be solved by a number of different approaches, including 
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military intervention, increasing dependency of the transit country on 
the pipeline, or most appealingly according to this framework, bringing 
the transit country into the multilateral agreement and developing 
dependence and interdependence between terminal and transit 
countries (Stevens, 2009).  
The relationship between IGO participation and shared energy 
infrastructure is complex. The only way that shared energy IGO 
participation can lead to shared infrastructure projects like pipelines is 
if shared interests, rather than national sovereignty and power, 
dominate. However, there is evidence that this is not the case. In fact, 
geopolitical struggles over shared projects like pipelines are common, 
driven both by sovereignty and security concerns and the interaction of 
multinational corporations (Klare, 2004). Another issue is the failure of 
market structures to help ensure supply and demand, which has 
significantly reduced the efficiency of deregulated energy markets 
(Helm, 2002). Although Helm (2002) suggested that a shift toward 
alternative energy was required, this development continues to lag in 
IEA countries (IEA, 2012b).  Another concern is that energy 
infrastructure is increasingly the target of terrorist and military attacks, 
increasing their physical security vulnerability (Farrell et al., 2004). 
Given these conditions, it is unlikely that the relationship between 
energy IGO membership and pipeline construction would be 
straightforward. However, the theoretical and empirical evidence does 
suggest that alignment of energy strategy through the energy IGO 
would reduce the distance between states and enable the possibility of 
shared energy infrastructure. 
Our second hypothesis can be put as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: When members of the same IGO, allied states will 
build more common energy infrastructure, such as pipelines.  
4. Control Variables 
There are two control variables that have been accounted for in the 
formulation of case studies. These control variables may serve as 
negative influences on the initial formation of energy IGOs, and may 
also influence the development of common security policies and 
eventualy-shared infrastructure. 
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The first of these control variables is state sovereignty. As 
previously stated, state sovereignty can be understood as an expression 
of state independence in Kroll‘s (1993) complex interdependence 
model, and it may be observed at varying levels of importance by states 
making different types of decisions. Independence is associated with 
state power, or ultimate control over fate and behaviour (Kroll, 1993). 
The two key aspects of state sovereignty that are identified as 
important in this relationship include the risk of not being able to 
control the direction of the IGO and the role of energy as a military or 
political strategic factor. These two aspects of the IGO could act as a 
negative factor for joining the IGO, particularly for a state that has 
heavily invested in its own energy security policy.  
The second control variable accounted for in this research is that of 
geographic contiguity, which serves as an obvious constraint on some 
forms of energy agreement. A canonical case of shared energy 
infrastructure (though not the only such case) is that of the oil transport 
pipeline, which may transit between oil generating areas and refinery 
areas, consumption areas, or distribution areas (ports). There are a 
number of such international pipelines either already in place or in the 
planning stages, although these pipelines are often contentious in 
internal politics as well as international relations (Cohen, 2009). The 
aspect of geographic contiguity can be seen in Cohen‘s (2009) 
discussion of pipelines in the Caspian basin, which show that dyads of 
adjacent states need to be in agreement in order to allow construction 
of shared energy infrastructure. For example, the pipeline agreement of 
China and Turkmenistan requires that the intermediate states 
(Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) must agree to the pipeline, since it must 
be built across their territory (Cohen, 2009). Thus, at least for a pipeline 
or other infrastructure that requires continuous connections, agreement 
between geographically adjacent dyads is required to implement the 
shared infrastructure. This is, as Cohen‘s (2009) discussion of rejection 
of various routes for Caspian pipelines by intervening countries shows, 
not a trivial concern. However, the formation of a multilateral energy 
security policy is more important, not least because a regional 
multilateral energy security policy is likely to improve conditions of 
acquiescence for infrastructure that requires geographic contiguity, like 
pipelines or shared energy distribution grids 
5. Case Studies 
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Two case studies of energy IGOs have been selected to explore the 
hypotheses posed in the sections above. These case studies are focused 
on energy IGOs that do not directly follow trade cooperation lines, 
although a number of trade agreements also include aspects of energy 
security procurement and cooperation. These two case studies, the IEA 
and SCO, show how international energy alliances result from threats 
to shared security concerns, as well as how membership leads to the 
development of shared infrastructure. As consumer or mixed 
consumer/producer IGOs, the IEA and SCO are also not explained 
adequately using the empirical analysis in the first chapter. Thus, the 
proposed model provides a different view, offering the opportunity to 
explain different types of energy IGOs. These case studies are analysed 
using the frameworks set out above, specifically identifying supporting 
factors for hypothesis 1 and 2.  
5.1 The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
The IEA is among the oldest international alliances profiled, as it 
was founded in the wake of the 1973-1974 oil crisis (IEA, 2012a). The 
original objectives of the organisation were centred on energy security, 
including reducing supply disruption, developing cooperative rational 
energy policies, and improving efficiency and infrastructure of the 
world energy supply. The main founding members (with the exception 
of Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States) were 
energy consumer nations (Scott, 1994). Evidence shows that the IEA 
was founded by states with strong existing alliances, trade flows, and 
economic and political strategy alignment. This case shows that both 
the foundational model for IGOs posed in Hypothesis 1 and the sharing 
of energy infrastructure (dependent on geography) posed in 
Hypothesis 2 applies to members of the IEA. 
5.1.1 The formation of the energy IGO 
The first and simplest foundation of the policy model comprises 
existing trade and political ties between the foundational and joining 
countries.  The IEA clearly meets the requirement that members of a 
new alliance have strong existing alliances prior to the alliance 
formation. Initially, the IEA included member states of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but 
did not include any non-OECD countries (Scott, 1994). This 
immediately suggests that these nations had strong trade ties at the 
time of foundation, since the OECD was explicitly founded to facilitate 
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and develop free trade between member states as well as between 
member states and non-member states (OECD, 2012). The OECD itself 
was established in 1948, and as such had been in place for 26 years by 
the founding of the IEA. This relationship has continued over time. An 
analysis of 21 of 24 OECD countries from 1970 to 2003 shows 
synchronization of business cycles during this period (Inklaar et al., 
2008). This study also showed that while trade flows were important, 
far stronger effects were seen from political and economic strategic 
policy alignment, especially short-term interest rates and deficits. Thus, 
there was a clear, long-standing strategic economic alliance between 
the countries that made up the IEA at the time of its founding, fulfilling 
the first criterion of the model in Hypothesis 1.  
The second criterion for the formation of an IGO is the alignment of 
energy interests among states in the formation of the IGO, especially in 
terms of shared vulnerabilities and sensitivity. Previous research 
regarding strategy-based reasons for entering into alliances has shown 
that formation of the IEA was based on alignment of (Krasner, 1976; 
Snyder, 2007). The IEA‘s initial formation strategy of coalition-building 
and trans governmental accountability allowed for the alignment of 
strategic needs (Keohane, 1978). However, as Keohane (1978) points 
out, the 1973 oil crisis, the precipitating factor in the formation of the 
IEA, was significant because it brought a new awareness of shared 
vulnerability to oil-producing states and sensitivity to their actions. In 
fact, this was the first point where OECD (and EEC) countries became 
aware of these shared energy priorities, as they had previously pursued 
very different energy security strategies (Lantzke, 1975). Thus, the 
foundational IEA states were prompted to join the IEA not just by 
existing trade ties, but also by the sudden alignment of energy security 
concerns from a previously unaligned and complex set of concerns.  
There does need to be consideration of sovereignty issues in the 
formation of the IEA. One case study has already demonstrated that 
some states, including France, opposed the formation of the IEA due to 
national sovereignty concerns (Lieber, 1980). The case of France and its 
opposition to the IEA‘s formation, which eventually ended in joining, 
shows that national sovereignty concerns are not always sufficient to 
prevent joining an IGO. The example of France, which was ultimately 
unsuccessful in using its own sovereign power to meet its energy goals, 
shows the importance of complex interdependence as a means for 
understanding the decision to join the IGO. However, it should be 
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noted that even states with a much higher degree of sovereign energy 
independence than France, such as the United States, joined the IEA 
(Katz, 1981). This suggests that interdependence may actually be a 
much more significant factor in the decision to join the energy IGO than 
sovereign power. However, it should be noted that the IEA was 
initially constructed as a policy forum, rather than an international 
body with any significant power (Katz, 1981). Katz (1981) argues that 
the IEA was significantly steered by the US in its early development, 
which perhaps reduced the resistance to joining. Although France did 
not have this extent of power over the IEA, it was instrumental in 
setting priorities for the EEC (Lieber, 1980), which could reduce some 
sovereignty concerns in this area. Over time, the IEA‘s role in energy 
policy has shifted and become more proactive in energy policy 
development (Van de Graaf & Lesage, 2009). This has not resulted in 
the loss of members, but this does not necessarily reflect on the position 
of state sovereignty vis-à-vis shared energy policy. Instead, it could 
reflect the political difficulty of withdrawing from an existing energy 
IGO.  
5.1.2 Shared infrastructure development  
The focus of the IEA is on developing energy efficiency and 
expanding infrastructure for member and non-member nations (IEA, 
2012a). In other words, the goal of the IEA is to formulate energy 
security frameworks, meeting the first criterion of the second 
hypothesis.  This suggests that, as Goldthau and Witte (2009) indicated, 
founding members did not support the idea that energy security was a 
zero-sum game, and instead viewed it as a cooperative game to expand 
and distribute resources. However, it does not show whether or not 
IEA nations engage in shared infrastructure development.  
There is significant empirical evidence for the development of 
shared energy infrastructure between IEA member states based on the 
shared energy security framework promoted by the organisation. One 
area of shared development is alternative energy technologies, such as 
offshore wind, hydro (wave) power, and concentrated solar power 
(CSP), as well as carbon capture and storage (CCS) (IEA, 2012b). The 
IEA (2012b) reports that these shared initiatives are not as advanced as 
they should be, due to lack of investment by IEA countries, but they do 
still represent shared infrastructure efforts. These efforts do not involve 
geographic contingency, but other efforts do. One such project is a 
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recent pipeline project intended to transport LNG between the Slovak 
Republic and the Czech Republic, with further development intended 
to integrate LNG markets in Poland and Croatia (IEA, 2012c). Multiple 
other examples also demonstrate the shared infrastructure 
development of IEA countries. One high-profile example is the 
Keystone pipeline and the proposed Keystone XL extension, which 
connect Canada‘s tar sands oil production regions to markets in the 
United States (Hoberg et al., 2012). This project is not without 
controversy, particularly the planned extension to the Gulf Coast, but it 
does represent significant cooperative infrastructure building. There 
are also multiple oil and natural gas pipelines that cross Europe, 
including inter-European pipelines and import pipelines from outside 
the EU (Bjørnmose et al., 2009). While the longest of these, the Druzhba 
pipeline, originates in a non-IEA member country (the Russian 
Federation), there are many other connecting and transit lines 
associated with IEA countries in the region (see the comparative graph 
1 after the SCO section), that demonstrate active cooperation in this 
area (Bjørnmose et al., 2009). 
5.1.3 Summary 
This discussion has shown that the case of the IEA fulfils the policy 
statements in Hypothesis 1, as it originated from sudden alignment of 
energy security concerns following the 1973 oil crisis as well as existing, 
long-standing trade relationships. These factors were sufficient to offset 
sovereignty concerns even for states with high levels of energy power, 
although this could be due to the initially low level of policy setting 
power of the organisation. Additionally, the causal mechanism posed 
in Hypothesis 2 can also be seen to be appropriate, with member states 
first engaging in alignment of energy security frameworks and then 
becoming involved in shared energy projects. Thus, the IEA serves as 
an example of the two models shown above.  
5.2 The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
The second energy IGO that is studied is the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO). This organisation is substantially smaller and 
newer than the IEA, as it was founded only in 2001, with the extension 
of a previously existing military defence organisation (Sutter, 2012). 
However, the SCO shows many of the same characteristics in its 
formation and involvement in shared energy projects as the IEA.  
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5.2.1 The formation of the energy IGO 
Like the IEA, the SCO was preceded by existing alliances between 
member states. However, rather than being primarily economic as with 
the OECD, the SCO‘s member states were previously engaged in 
defence alliances. The SCO is a descendant of the Shanghai Five. The 
Shanghai Five were a group of five member states (the People‘s 
Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan), 
which signed a sequence of mutual defence treaties in 1996 and 1997 
(Sutter, 2012). This series of mutual defence treaties gradually 
expanded from military defence to include anti-terrorism, smuggling, 
and other illegal, cross-border regional activities (Sutter, 2012). The 
SCO was formed in 2001 with the addition of Uzbekistan, which had 
previously had bilateral defence relationships with the five existing 
member states (Sutter, 2012). This means that the main strategic goals 
of the SCO were military defence, rather than economic trade. This is a 
classical strategic reason for the formation of external alliances (Buzan 
& Waever, 2003; Deese, 1979; Gelpi, 1999; Keohane, 1978; Long, 2003; 
Long & Leeds, 2006).  The main purpose of the SCO remains military 
defence, as well as reduction of tensions, particularly between China 
and Russia, which have historically had conflict along the shared 
border (Bailes & Dunay, 2007). However, there are also energy 
components to the IGO‘s formation, which are part of the IGO‘s 
structure as a general defence organisation (De Haas, 2008). These 
include the 2006 formation of an Energy Club and the 2007 proposal of 
a unified energy market (Matveeva & Giustozzi, 2008). 
The domination of the SCO by China would seem to reject the 
alignment of energy security interests in the region. However, this is 
not necessarily the case. China argues that it is not seeking a hegemonic 
leadership position, but is instead protecting the region economically as 
well as politically from the encroachment of US hegemony (Carroll, 
2011). It cannot be denied that China‘s interests have significantly 
shaped the SCO, as it is by far the largest member (Carroll, 2011). At 
the same time, however, there are significant interdependencies 
between the SCO states that promote the shared interests. Members of 
the SCO, including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, have significant oil 
and LNG resources, but no clear path to market, especially given the 
opposition by neighbouring countries with their own reserves (Bahgat, 
2002; Cohen, 2009). These countries are also in a difficult political 
position, often isolated between Asian and European political interests 
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(Marketos, 2009). Thus, the strategically interdependent nature of the 
alliance becomes clear. While China‘s dominant interest is that of 
ensuring oil supply, many of the other member states have interest in 
ensuring and accessing demand for their oil resources, as well as a clear 
political affiliation (Demir, 2012; Marketos, 2009).  
The SCO takes a particular approach to reducing the influence of 
sovereignty concerns on entry into the energy IGO – it eliminates 
concern with domestic activities. The defence interests of the SCO 
states also varies widely, particularly given that three of its member 
states produce significant amounts of oil (Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan), while the other three produce little or none (Bailes & 
Dunay, 2007). It is likely that the SCO will remain primarily a defence 
and energy security IGO, given its position of ignoring domestic issues 
such as authoritarianism and political determination struggles 
(Hessbruegge, 2004). However, this does lower barriers to entry such as 
those faced by the IEA.  
5.2.2 Shared infrastructure development 
As with the IEA, the shared energy interests of the SCO members 
have promoted the development of shared energy infrastructure. One 
project is the China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline, which came online in 2006 
(Guoqing, 2012). The Central Asia-China pipeline, which transports 
natural gas from Turkmenistan to China through Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan, came online in late 2012 (Jarosiewicz, 2012). A third such 
project is a pipeline linking Russia and China, which ensures China 
300,000 barrels/day and opening Asian export markets for Russian oil 
(Gorst, 2010). This project opened in 2010. In some cases, such as the 
Central Asia-China pipeline, this has involved some of the SCO state 
acting as transit states (Cohen, 2009). The existence of SCO states in the 
alliance is one possible way to reduce resistance to this type of 
international transit pipeline (Stevens, 2009).  
There is no specific incident that can be identified that suddenly 
realigned interests between IGO members like the IEA‘s experience of 
the 1973 oil crisis. However, there is clear evidence for this type of 
interest alignment. One reason for such a multilateral energy security 
alignment is the conflict of interests between China, the European 
Union, and the United States, all of which compete for limited 
resources (Hasan, 2010). The precipitating factor in this case is the 
emerging oil and natural gas resources of the Central Asian region, 
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which are highly sought after by other regions (Hasan, 2010). However, 
this is not without conflict. Russia and China do have conflicting 
interests in energy supply and demand, although they continue to 
cooperate with each other within the SCO (Yun & Park, 2012).   
Shared infrastructure development within the SCO has been 
somewhat more contentious than in the IEA. Shared pipelines between 
the Caspian states and China are clearly advantageous to both groups, 
as it provides both supply and demand assurance and meets the 
interdependency requirements of both states (Cohen, 2009). This puts 
these states in conflict with Russia, which as a major oil producing state 
also has an interest in ensuring its market (Öksüz, 2009). However, 
there are clear advantages for Russia as well, since supplying China 
offers it a stable and high-demand market (Proedrou, 2012). The size of 
the Chinese energy market is likely to be the determinant of success in 
this area, as it drives many of the energy policy decisions within the 
SCO. This market is rapidly growing. For example, the 2011 market for 
natural gas was 18.2% higher than in 2009 (Lamoureux, 2011). Thus, for 
the time being the demand element of the market is likely to be stable. 
 The political relationship of Russia and China within the SCO is an 
evolving relationship that represents a significant step forward in terms 
of cooperation from previous periods (Bailes & Dunay, 2007). 
Ultimately, the SCO is still a young IGO, and its internal politics are 
still under evolution (Matveeva & Giustozzi, 2008). This development 
has already resulted in rapid cross-border development of shared 
energy infrastructure, which is likely to continue over time (see graph 1 
below). 
5.2.3 Summary  
This case study has shown that the SCO is considerably younger 
and smaller than the IEA, and that the existing connections between 
states were primarily military rather than trade-based. However, many 
of the same conditions that were found at the base of the IEA can also 
be seen in the case of the SCO. For example, alignment of energy 
security interests can be seen in the relationships between China and 
the oil-producing states along the Caspian, which provide a much 
stronger case for mutual interdependence between these states. 
Regardless of the age and primarily military basis of the SCO compared 
to the IEA, the member countries have aligned their energy policy and 
begun to build shared energy infrastructure, especially international oil 
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pipelines intended to maximize the supply to China and ability of oil-
producing countries to reach markets. This clearly shows the 
interdependence of energy IGO members and their aligned energy 
security frameworks and their realization in shared infrastructure. 
Although there are concerns around the Russia-China relationship and 
their conflicting interests, as well as the interests of transit states, the 
SCO has shown that these concerns do not overcome market (supply 
and demand) concerns. 
 
GRAPH 1: Evolution in the number of cross-border pipelines in IEA 
and SCO, comparative data 
5.3 Discussion of Results 
The two case studies profiled offer slightly different viewpoints on 
the theoretical framework and its implications. The IEA and SCO differ 
in a number of ways that change the outcomes and means of analysis, 
even though the basic framework serves to explain the formation of 
energy alliances between member states and the construction of shared 
infrastructure.  
The IEA can be characterized as a mature consumer energy 
organization, concerned primarily with energy security for members 
from heterogeneous sources. The IEA does not have a single dominant 
partner driving its interest formation, although it does have various 
interest blocs. It also is not geographically concentrated, including 
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member states in North America, Europe, and Asia. In contrast, the 
SCO is an organization of both consumers and producers, some of 
whom maintain international energy supply connections as well. It is 
geographically concentrated, and is focused on oil and natural gas 
supplies. The SCO, unlike the IEA, does have dominant member states, 
with China‘s energy demand and Russia‘s role as major oil producer 
dominating its energy policy making and structure. These differences 
in configuration of the respective alliances are likely to make a 
significant difference in how states form energy policies and build 
infrastructure. 
One of the most obvious issues that emerge from this analysis is the 
dominance of supply and demand in the construction of intra-IGO 
infrastructure. This factor is integral to the formation of a multilateral 
energy security framework, which would take into account different 
needs of countries in terms of demand. Kroll‘s (1993) model of 
dependence, interdependence, and independence can serve to explain 
these relationships in part, as illustrated by the case of the Russia-China 
gas pipeline. This web of dependence, interdependence, and 
independence can be illustrated with the Turkmenistan-China pipeline. 
This pipeline is intended to supply natural gas to China, which has one 
of the most rapidly growing demands in the world for energy supplies 
(Lamoureux, 2011). The growth in demand for natural gas as well as 
crude oil and other energy resources might be seen as the dominant 
factor in the development of energy security frameworks in the SCO. 
However, this is not necessarily the case. For example, while China 
gains guaranteed access to 300,000 barrels/day of Russian oil through 
the Russia-China pipeline, the pipeline itself will eventually allow the 
flow of 1.6 million barrels/day (approximately a third of Russia‘s total 
production) into the Pacific region (Gorst, 2010). Thus, this energy 
infrastructure improvement supports the needs of both the supplier 
(for guaranteed markets and access to new markets) and the buyer (for 
guaranteed access to energy resources). Importantly, this issue of 
supply and demand was sufficient to overcome considerable political 
conflict between Russia and China, which have had a history of 
military and political conflict and which continue to compete for 
regional dominance (Marketos, 2009).  
Another issue is the issue of substitution. In many cases, shared 
energy transport infrastructure is a replacement for a similar, less 
effective method of transporting energy. For example, the Russia-China 
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pipeline, which transports oil from Eastern Siberia to north-eastern 
China, is not a new trade link. Instead, it is a connection that is 
intended to replace transport of crude oil via tanker cars on an existing 
railroad (Gorst, 2010). Gorst (2010) noted that transport via pipeline 
would be more economically efficient than tanker transport, but this 
does not necessarily mean that this represents a deepening 
commitment to the existing relationship by either Russia or China. The 
issue of substitution shows that the decision to build shared energy 
infrastructure is not just based on economic factors, but really does 
represent the extension of an existing relationship. The origins for this 
relationship can be found within the theoretical model, including the 
existing trade relationships (which in many cases may include energy 
trade) and the formation of a multilateral energy security policy. 
A final issue is the political controversy that often surrounds shared 
infrastructure projects outside the main considerations of aligned 
economic and energy interests. The Keystone XL extension, one of the 
IEA projects identified, is an example of this. In both the United States 
and Canada, there are substantial political debates and arguments over 
this pipeline, although the specifics of the debate differ (Hoberg et al., 
2012). In both states, there is considerable concern about the economic, 
environmental, and other implications of the project, although these are 
expressed somewhat differently and are subject to different procedural 
rules. Furthermore, sub-national governments and courts also play a 
major role in determining the outcomes of the planned extension 
(Hoberg et al., 2012). These sub-national governments and courts are 
not accounted for in the IGO framework, which solely focuses on the 
interests of the state at the national and international level. However, 
this does not mean that these sub-national political concerns are not 
important when it comes to determining participation in shared energy 
infrastructure projects. 
Ultimately, what can be said about the cases of the IEA and SCO, 
which show such similarities even though they are very different 
organizations? Although the organizations have different focuses, they 
do have similarities in terms of how energy policy is handled and the 
implications of the model for policymaking. The cases also show that 
although a shared energy infrastructure at the international level is 
precipitated by factors like participation in the IGOs, shared energy 
security frameworks, and supply and demand factors, this does not 
explain much about the internal politics of states. These internal politics 
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are likely to influence the process of IGOs‘ formation and shared 
energy infrastructure projects at all stages, and because of this they 
may be over determining on the theoretical model discussed in this 
research. However, as the Russia-China pipeline shows, it is clear that 
internal politics and existing relationships between states do not 
entirely constrain or eliminate the possibility of energy cooperation and 
shared infrastructure even between rivalrous states. Thus, the model of 
this research does not take everything into account, but it does still 
provide a reliable explanation for shared energy infrastructure 
construction. 
5.3.1 Implications 
The main policy implication of this research has to do with the 
frequent failure of energy IGOs to promote the construction of shared 
energy infrastructure, despite seemingly aligned interests. Both IEA 
and SCO cases show that shared energy infrastructure results when 
there are mutual supply and demand advantages, even where there are 
political conflicts (such as those between Russia and China). However, 
the problem of transit countries, as well as the complexity of decisions, 
can often delay or limit these projects. For example, the case of the SCO 
shows that direct conflict between Russia and China, as well as the 
dominance of China‘s interests compared to periphery states like 
Turkmenistan, have seriously influenced the form and structure of 
infrastructure projects. It is at this point that flows of dependence, 
interdependence, and independence need to be considered, as they 
inform the analysis and enable understanding of why such an effort 
might be limited. Overall, these cases show that shared IGO 
membership and geographic contiguity (or allied transit countries) are 
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for energy infrastructure. 
Instead, countries need to have aligned economic interests, such as the 
relationship between supplier and buyer, in order to generate this type 
of infrastructure. Thus, alignment of economic interests should be a 
major point of analysis in understanding shared infrastructure projects.  
5.3.2 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research  
There are some key limitations that should be considered in this 
research. One such limitation is lack of transparency in decision-
making within the case study of SCO, which is known to be an issue 
and which limits much policy analysis in this area (Bailes & Dunay, 
2007). The problem of inadequate transparency means that much of the 
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policy analysis is based on post hoc or outcome analysis, rather than 
specific policy statements or monitoring by the IGO itself. However, 
this limitation leads to an opportunity for future research, including 
rigorous analysis of the SCO itself and its policy direction. Marketos 
(2009) has been among the first authors to start this work, but much of 
this analysis is specifically from the consumer perspective (i.e. China‘s 
energy policy as a major consumer). Focusing on producer and transit 
countries within the SCO and international relationships outside the 
SCO would deepen the available information and increase the 
reliability of analysis in this area. The qualitative case studies could be 
supported using a large-n quantitative analysis, potentially including a 
time series or panel component in order to understand changes over 
time.  
6. Conclusion 
An energy intergovernmental organisation (IGO) can be briefly 
defined as an intergovernmental organisation that deals with concerns 
of energy security. With the establishment of energy IGOs during the 
1970s and 1980s, these concerns were primarily securing an appropriate 
supply of oil and natural gas resources in the face of constrained 
supply and oil cartels. Over time, however, issues like peak oil and 
anthropogenic climate change, as well as the opening of new oil 
sources like the Caspian states, have gradually shifted the role of 
energy IGOs to development of alternative energy technologies. The 
influence and power of energy IGOs has also shifted, with the IEA 
moving from a purely advisory position to being significantly involved 
in setting energy policy for its member states.  
The goal of this analysis was to explain the formation or joining of 
the energy IGO and acting within it for goals such as shared energy 
infrastructure. The theoretical discussion first posited that a 
combination of factors led to the formation or joining of an IGO, as 
described under Hypothesis 1. The first such factor was existing 
political or trade ties, like trade agreements or military defence pacts. 
The second such factor was an alignment of energy security concerns 
including dependence or sensitivity and interdependence or 
vulnerability concerns. However, these concerns needed to be balanced 
against concerns of state sovereignty, such as control over the direction 
of the IGO‘s operations and the violation of state sovereignty norms. 
Together, these factors would determine in the first instance whether a 
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state would join a given IGO or not, and in the second instance how the 
IGO would be designed and structured. The second mechanism of this 
research, described as Hypothesis 2, focused on shared infrastructure 
projects as the realization of aligned interests as expressed through the 
energy IGO. This hypothesis posited that following the formation of the 
energy IGO, the states involved would align their energy security 
strategic frameworks, which would allow for the development of 
shared energy infrastructure. Geographic contiguity was also a factor in 
the successful development of land-based energy infrastructure like 
pipelines. 
Two case studies were used to demonstrate the policy-making and 
investment models posed in Hypothesis 1 and 2. The first case study 
was the IEA, which is the first energy consumer IGO established. The 
IEA was established in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis from OECD 
member states, which already had extensive and long-running trade 
ties. The IEA‘s energy security interests had been abruptly aligned by 
the oil crisis and the sudden threatening of supply, and this formed the 
basis for both its role in ensuring supply and its role in developing 
alternative energy technologies. The IEA‘s formation was not 
uncontested, as the case of France shows. However, it did gradually 
gain strength over time as perceptions of its role as threatening national 
sovereignty was reduced. The IEA has engaged in a number of 
common infrastructure development projects, including the 
development of alternative technologies as well as pipeline projects. 
The current development of pipelines in the Balkan region, including 
the Slovakian Republic and the Czech Republic, show that the IEA has 
been successful in promoting shared infrastructure projects. 
The second case study, of the SCO, provides support for both the 
first and second hypotheses. The SCO was established first as the 
Shanghai Five in 1997, as a military organisation intending to protect 
the region from incursions by US interests and others. However, it also 
has taken on more general security concerns in the region, including 
energy concerns. Given that the SCO states include a number of oil 
producing states along the Caspian Sea as well as Russia, and a major 
oil demanding state (China), there is some opportunity for alignment of 
interests among these states. The SCO has solved the problem of 
sovereignty by ceding all control over domestic affairs, which could 
have reduced the resistance to formation of the energy IGO. Thus, in 
terms of its formation the SCO is very similar to the IEA, although it is 
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newer and there was no single event that can be pinpointed as the 
cause of a sudden alignment. The SCO is in many ways not as 
straightforward as the IEA, with multiple oil producing countries as 
well as one major consumer (China), and with competing and 
conflicted political interests. It is also a much younger and more 
dynamic alliance than the IEA. Within the SCO, China‘s interests as an 
energy consumer drive much of the shared infrastructure building that 
takes place. However, this is not an absolute. For example, the Russia-
China oil pipeline is intended to supply China, but will also allow 
Russia access to Pacific markets for its Siberian crude oil (Marketos, 
2009). Once again, within the SCO shared infrastructure decisions are 
driven by supply and demand considerations, rather than simply 
existing relationships within the IGO. This both supports the 
hypotheses of the research and shows that the SCO, though nominally 
an energy security and military security organization, also has 
substantial economic implications.   
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- 4 - 
Regulate to Compete 
How European Networks of Energy Regulators Reinforce the 
Competitiveness Agenda of National Regulatory Authorities 
1. Introduction 
Energy represents one of the most affected commodities by the 
forces of globalization. A primary role of the European Commission 
(EC) is the regulation of various industries in Europe (Jones 2011), with 
energy competition emerging a key concern with respect to multiple-
member states. The European Union (EU) is grounded in the 
assumption that increasing trade fluidity, facilitated by a common 
currency area, is preferable to more isolated market-systems. 
Limitations placed on energy competition, consequently, counter the 
economic interests of not only member-states but also those of the 
entire European collective. The transition of regulatory control over 
energy production and consumption from states to the EC has been an 
arduous one, and, as the autonomy of member-states becomes 
increasingly reduced, significant implications for energy competition in 
Europe emerge. In essence, the opening of energy markets throughout 
Europe is essential to the sustainability of the EC, as energy represents 
a unique commodity informative of multiple aspects of trade, including 
supply and demand. Key advantages for the nation-state, despite a 
diminished level of regulatory control, then emerge from improved 
energy competition, and this study is rationalized by the assumed 
benefit to member-states from energy competition generated at the EC 
level (Black 2002; Heritier 2002; Lodge 2008; Moran 2002). In this 
research, we use a policy model framework to examine two specific 
cases of energy regulation through the European Networks of Energy 
Regulators (ENERs), looking at the interactions between the national 
regulatory agency (NRA), energy industry, national government, and 
the EC as a means of explaining the role of the ENER in improving 
competition, transparency, accountability, and independence within 
the national energy sector. We use a qualitative policy model based on 
the previous work of Putnam (1988) and others to help explain the 
causal relationship between the ENER and energy sector competition at 
the national level.  
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The case studies we have selected include the Czech Republic and 
Spain, with these cases selected for their diverse characteristics and 
variability according to the selected model. In the Czech Republic, we 
focus on the 2004 ascension to the EU and joining of the Council of 
European Energy Regulators (CEER), and the subsequent movement of 
the Energy Regulatory Office (ERO) to harmonise Czech energy 
legislation to the European acquis communautaire concerning the 
liberalization of the electricity and gas sectors. In Spain, we focus on 
Spain‘s involvement in ACER and the effects of this involvement on the 
electricity and gas sectors. In both cases, we focus on accountability, 
transparency, and independence of the ENERs involved and the 
resulting improvement in energy market competition at the national 
level. Our contribution to the body of literature concerns the analysis of 
ENERs impact over national competitiveness levels. Our aim is to 
unveil the causal relations that link European-led supranational 
networks to modifications in domestic markets.  
The global marketplace is increasingly shaped by the movement of 
energy, with emerging regulatory frameworks such as that provided by 
the EC serving to a fill an urgent need; existing regulations were 
insufficient in addressing the nature of global competition with respect 
to both the energy sector, specifically, and across industry lines, more 
broadly. Energy competition is a core and critical element of the single-
market system which the EC and EU seek to cultivate, with multiple 
actions taken at the EC level to promote energy competition through 
enhanced, higher-level regulation. Nation-states have responded to the 
enhanced, supranational control in various ways, with many failing to 
adhere to mandated competition regulations. Gaps in proposed 
competition goals and the realities of the energy sector in nation-states 
failing to meet EC-guided outcomes emerge largely from the transition 
process from state to EC control.  
Mechanisms of control, additionally, are markedly diverse, and the 
malfunctioning of energy markets in nations without sufficient 
competition is indicative of a need for change. While the energy market 
has become generally and fortunately liberalized during recent years, 
single-market status marked by integration and competition within the 
EU has not yet been accomplished; this is largely attributable to various 
forces, including the unique nature of energy, diminished national role 
in regulation, and a general and unaddressed discrepancy between 
domestic market regulation and European, supranational networks. As 
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energy regulators become increasingly more effective and influential 
on the emerging single-market system, their emphasis on streamlining 
competition in the energy sector will increase and concurrently become 
more effective. Undergirding this study is the assumption that energy 
competition will be directly boosted by three, key characteristics of 
energy regulators; these are accountability, independence, and 
transparency. Additionally integral to the study is the notion that these 
regulating bodies will play a key role in shaping not only the structure 
of the energy market but also the key policies involved. According to 
Thurner and Hatzold (2010), energy represents the most influential 
commodity in the global marketplace: ‗energy is not a commodity as 
any other commodity – it is the most important input factor for 
economic production and consumption – and finally for the survival of 
political leaders and whole political entities. The production and 
consumption of fossil fuels is highly asymmetrically distributed around 
the globe with some countries being net producers and others being 
highly dependent on the import from net producers. Trade is 
accomplished often over long distances and transit countries.‘  
By extension, the mechanisms guiding energy‘s movement, 
competition, production, and consumption are tantamount to those 
which guide the entire, global trade system. This study then provides a 
salient direction for future research in that it forges connections 
between energy competition, enhanced regulation, and plausible 
instruments for mediating gaps between domestic and supranational 
control.  
2. European Energy Regulation   
2.1 Regulatory Agencies in Europe – Beginning and Development 
Majone (1994, 1997) introduced the concept of regulation in 
European political science academia. Majone argued that the state was 
moving away from its previous functions of stabilization and 
redistribution, instead focusing on regulation and the development of 
the regulatory state. At the same time, the European Commission 
adopted regulation as one of its central tasks (Jones 2011).  
The lack of accountability through direct elections was seen as a 
reason to avoid increasing reliance on regulation at the EU level, since 
this would endanger European democratic institutions (Majone 1994, 
1997). European political writing focused on analysing this loss of 
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control for the government and the risks involved with this loss. 
Scholars worked on the mechanisms leading the growth of European 
regulation. The focus was on understanding how the top-down policy 
integration among states impacted countries, societies, and the 
industry. Researchers were also interested in the practical outcomes of 
the regulatory waves, both for states and the EU (Black 2002; Héritier 
2002; Moran 2002; Lodge 2008). 
2.2 National Regulatory Agencies – Domestic Constraints 
Works focusing on the role of the European Union in the regulatory 
process accompanied these broader studies. The general outcome was 
not in favour of a preeminent role for the Commission. Changes in 
national frameworks resulted mostly from a domestic political process 
of acceptance of the need to open up to competition (Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2003). Factors that accounted for constraint of EU action on 
member states were limited. An important finding was that the EU 
primarily played a coordinating role between European regulatory 
agencies, rather than playing a command and control role, and that 
states maintained strong control of these coordinating functions 
(Majone 2005; Zeitlin et al. 2005). Another important finding was that 
the EU faced significant difficulties in finding a tool to directly impact 
member states (Kelemen 2002; Chalmers and Lodge 2003; Lodge 2007). 
Furthermore, member states‘ different starting points in regulation 
made harmonization of the regulatory frameworks across the EU a 
significant challenge (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Zeitlin and Pochet 
2005; Lodge 2007). 
These studies posited that unsystematic variance depends on two 
factors. The first factor is the compatibility of the existing national 
institutional architecture with EU norms. While there is an 
incorporation of the EU norms at the domestic level, national actors are 
still in charge of the implementation. States were then free to interpret 
European normative frameworks in different ways, as long as 
outcomes tended to harmonization (Héritier and Knill 2001; Cowles et 
al. 2001; Sabel and Zeitlin 2007; Börzel and Risse 2003). The second 
factor concerns the opportunity that European reforms offer to 
domestic interest groups to change the domestic power balance and 
bypass the constraint of national veto players. Institutions empowered 
by EU norms contribute to weakening the various veto points of a 
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country, according to several studies (Cowles et al. 2001; Zeitlin and 
Pochet 2005; Börzel and Risse 2003).  
Proponents of the rational design approach share this view 
concerning the motivations behind the government‘s action. However, 
they also argue that there is a trend in the energy field and in the other 
network sectors toward an increased coordination between the 
different actors in the system (Börzel 2010). These scholars posit that we 
are now facing a hybrid system, where powers are unclearly divided 
between the European Union and the national level (von Danwitz 2008; 
Lavrijssen-Heijmans and Hancher 2008). The European networks of 
energy agencies are gradually acquiring formal powers that allow them 
to directly intervene on stakeholders (van Ooik 2005). Thus, the 
interaction between European and national-level energy regulators 
needs to be considered carefully. 
2.3 European Energy Regulators - Influence on Member States 
Generally, literature on European regulation and studies on the 
competitive conditions in the European energy sector have paid little 
systematic attention to the impact of European networks of energy 
regulators on the competition outcomes of member states. A few recent 
papers have addressed the issue of European networks‘ power of 
diffusing policies, but they failed to connect the legislative action of 
networks to its natural target, i.e. the competition performance of the 
market.  
One notable example is Maggetti and Gilardi (2011). These authors 
worked on the role of network centrality in the domestic adoption of 
standards decided at the network level. In their case-study analysis on 
the Committee of European Securities Regulators, the authors noted 
that ―(…) these standards, although on a voluntary basis, are adopted 
quite consistently as compulsory regulations by member states. 
Therefore, decision making within ERNs matters. More precisely, (…) 
we identified five patterns of adoption (…) that do not match with 
those expected following the (…) arguments developed in the literature 
on Europeanization. This result is intriguing because it shows that the 
effect of European networks on domestic regulations is mediated by 
different factors than those evoked for traditional European-level 
processes, policies and institutions‖ (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011: 17).  
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An advantage provided by the ENERs is that the ties between 
various members are unusually robust (Maggetti and Gilardi 2011). 
Most policy networks are loosely grouped and permeable agencies that 
do not have strong relationships with other agencies. In contrast, the 
ENERs have a well-defined structure, which is characterized by 
significant competencies and resources. The different entities in the 
ENER networks work well together and generally promote 
constructive interactions, which heighten the competencies of those 
involved. These tightly knit groups result in peer pressures for constant 
improvement and increased levels of competition (Maggetti and 
Gilardi 2011). 
The literature presently has a shortcoming related to the 
relationship between European-led supranational networks and the 
effect of these networks on domestic markets. Specifically, there is a 
lack of information regarding the effect that ENERs can have on levels 
of competitiveness in the energy sector. The hypothesis of this study is 
that levels of competitiveness in the energy sector are the result of 
ENERs increasing accountability, independence and transparency. 
According to this hypothesis, the increased level of knowledge 
regarding the performance of regulated entities in the energy sector 
will result in more competitive market practices. The independence of 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) from the government means 
the regulated entities have the opportunity to fairly compete with each 
other in order to increase their profitability and other performance 
measures. 
ENERs, both the ones concerning only EU member states and those 
designed to include neighbouring countries, have a role in changing 
the structure of the energy market and the related legislation. The 
attempt to account for changes in the competition side of the energy 
markets without considering their role would lead to flawed results.  
3. Theoretical Background: Regulatory Agencies and National 
Competition 
By creating independent agencies such as ENERs, the government's 
organizational structure becomes more attractive (Vos 2005). The 
agencies that are free of the government tend to have higher levels of 
transparency and accountability. With regard to the European Union 
and ENERs, the tasks which are assigned to these agencies are more 
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precise and easier to quantify than traditional government agencies. 
National Regulatory Agencies are designed to be independent of the 
government, and under the ENERs framework they can be compared 
with each other to evaluate their levels of action on the market. Like its 
national members, the ENER becomes answerable for its actions and is 
structured to require accountability and transparency (Vos 2005). 
Our argument advances the idea that the increase of competition 
levels in the national energy sectors is a function of the countries‘ 
membership in one or more European networks of energy regulators 
(ENERs). Membership of ENERs may be comprised of EU member 
countries only, or may integrate neighbouring countries. Examples of 
EU member ENERs include the European Regulators‘ Group for 
Electricity and Gas (ERGEG), the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER), and the Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER). Examples of ENERs that integrate EU member states and 
neighbouring countries include the Energy Community and the 
Association of the Mediterranean Regulators for Electricity and Gas 
(MEDREG).  
3.1 The ENER’s Role in Competition   
Ultimately, the goal of the ENER is that it promotes fair competition 
within the market. The acquis communautaire (or body of European law) 
referring to energy regulation constitutes the reference for regulation. 
The inherent structure of the ENERs increases independence from 
governmental decision-making, thereby augmenting compliance to 
regulatory standards (such as transparency), which results in more 
competitive energy markets. The mechanisms the ENERs use for this 
function include mechanisms related to accountability, transparency, 
and independency.  
3.1.1.Accountability 
Regulations establish a benchmark by which the ENERs can be 
judged and held accountable. Energy regulation may involve either 
social or economic concerns, though it commonly involves both. The 
European energy acquis communautaire strongly intertwines the concept 
of liberalization of competition with the objectives of regulation. 
Regulation is characterized by the formalization of the private-public 
relationship in the political domain (CTRRCE 2007; von Danwitz 2008).  
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We can understand the objectives of energy regulation through two 
different, yet complementary, lenses: from the viewpoint of industries 
(guaranteeing competition) and the viewpoint of customers (protecting 
public welfare) (OECD 2005). From the industry‘s viewpoint, energy 
regulation can be depicted as a sector-specific set of laws that guarantee 
an appropriate degree of competition in the liberalized market 
(Hauteclocque 2008). One example of this type of focus is the call on the 
part of Eurelectric (the Union of the Electricity Industry, an electricity 
sector interests association) to enforce more cogent standards on 
congestion management and the harmonization of transmission tariffs 
(EurActiv 2009). From the consumer viewpoint, energy regulation sets 
standards that protect the public welfare (e.g. concerning tariffs and 
supply) (de Suzzoni 2012). Regulation in relation to consumer interests 
is strongly intertwined with the concepts of accountability of the 
supervising authority. The Report on Energy Regulation and 
Consumers‘ Interests states that consumer interests in European energy 
regulations include the reduction of search and switching costs (or 
costs associated with initial selection or change of energy provider) and 
the release of updated data on the continuity of energy supply 
(CTRRCE 2007). 
As regards both the industry and the consumers, clear and 
dependable information is a rare good in the energy market, because 
there is a lack of reliable sources of reference (Solana and Carranza 
2011). As a consequence, the accountability of the regional regulators is 
a necessary requirement for having a fair competition in the energy 
sector. Consumers are often unaware of the various offers provided by 
utilities, while firms struggle to understand the exact shape of the 
market and plan their industrial actions. A history of credible 
information increases the confidence of the industry and invite for 
industry investments (CTRRCE 2007). At the same time, accountability 
is directly linked to transparency, as transparency also reduces the 
opportunities that firms have to undertake collusive activities (which 
increase consumer costs) (Diathesopoulos 2010). 
3.1.2 Transparency  
Higher transparency means revising the market to make it more 
understandable and predictable for the actors involved. The Council of 
European Energy Regulators (CEER) is an ENER that represents 
national energy regulators of EU member states. Since CEER is a self-
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managed organization of regulators, it works independently of the 
governments of the national-level regulators that make up its 
membership. CEER requires annual reports detailing the activities of 
energy regulators and CEER itself, which serve the purpose of holding 
the Council accountable for its decisions and level of competitiveness. 
The reports provide increased levels of transparency on the work of the 
agency, and establish a reference set of norms to which NRAs can be 
held accountable.  
The Commission has noted the importance of the transparency 
aspect in its regulatory action on the internal energy market as well as 
in the energy initiatives toward neighbouring countries (Commission 
of the European Communities 2001; Eikeland 2008). One of the goals of 
the establishment of CEER was to increase market accessibility, 
especially by removing distortions that prevent market players from 
knowing the full range of options available. As the European 
Commissioner for Energy, Günther Oettinger (2011:5), argues, 
European legislative proposals should guarantee ―transparency at a 
programme level (…) where all stakeholders can participate and where 
results are made publicly available‖. 
3.1.3 Independence 
European regulatory authorities have a high degree of decisional 
autonomy when compared to the classic forms of intergovernmental 
organizations, such as the United Nations. In other words, there is a 
high level of independence built into the top-down regulatory 
structure. This attribute comes from the characteristics of the 
institutional designs of energy agencies. Classic IGOs submit their 
proposals to the ratification of their member states, and their direct 
intervention on countries is quite limited. They do not substitute the 
state in the accomplishment of some of its administrative duties; they 
rather support it with recommendations and other mild forms of 
intervention (Abbott and Snidal 2009). ENERs are peculiar entities 
when considered under this classical structure. ENERs are formally 
independent in their decision-making processes from both 
governments and the regulated industry (Larsen et al. 2005). They 
accomplish administrative actions more independently than other IGOs 
and are not required to report to governmental structures. European 
networks of regulators can be defined as independent inter-
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governmental organizations (IGOs), since they do not have to directly 
respond to governments, even if they are part of the executive sphere.  
The EU Commission has been mostly supportive of independent 
regulatory bodies. The EU‘s policymaking bodies have often seen 
regulation as a way to bypass the financial and political constraints 
posed by member states to EU actions (Majone 1996; Moran 2002). The 
objective was to establish a network of national bodies that were in 
direct contact with the Commission and could be used to implement its 
policy directives. The creation of state authorities moved the costs to 
the country level. Subsequent directives aimed at increasing the 
independence of these authorities from national executives served to 
link them further to the EU through the establishment of ENERs (EU 
Commission 2010). Because security of supply is among their main 
mandates, ENERs have engaged neighbouring countries (i.e., the 
Mediterranean and Balkan countries) in European-led regional 
networks of regulators (Youngs 2007). These ENERs promote the EU 
concept of energy regulation to states where governments hold the 
predominant influence on the social and economic aspects of the 
energy market (OME 2004). ENERs become more competitive when 
they are independent because they do not have to directly consider 
political instances and priorities in their decisions. Instead, they can 
follow their mandate autonomously and monitor the energy market 
and consumers‘ response to it without political interference. 
The notion of political independence is strong in theory, but may 
not be as strong in practice. The executive power is responsible, in 
some cases together with the legislative bodies, for the nomination of 
representatives to regulatory authorities (OECD 2005). Governments 
have been accused of using regulation to reduce political 
accountability, as regulatory entities are not subjected to the direct vote 
of citizens (van Ooik 2005). Governments remain partially in control of 
some of these non-majoritarian instruments, to which they may assign 
responsibility for unpopular choices while still exerting control over 
their decisions (Lodge 2001). Significant doubt regarding the legitimacy 
of regulatory bodies is found where there is both a lack of knowledge 
about their activities and results and about their linkages with 
governments and the industry (OECD 2005; Gasmi et al. 2006).  
While the argument that political power can hamper the 
accountability and transparency of regulatory bodies has its merits, it is 
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also true that countries that are members of an ENER will tend to 
operate in a more transparent manner. Additionally, it is easier to hold 
them accountable according to the established regulations, as all 
European networks develop regular reports on the current status of 
energy regulation in member countries. These reports, together with 
the publications ENERs periodically release on different matters 
concerning energy regulation, allow all energy stakeholders to know 
the status and changes of different aspects in the energy market. Thus, 
the ENER structure itself provides mechanisms for accountability and 
transparency. 
4. The Policy-Making Model 
For the qualitative analysis that forms the bulk of this research, we 
have constructed a policy-making model based on previous work by 
Putnam (1988) and others that explains the causal relationship between 
ENER membership and increased competition at the national level. The 
goal of this policy-making model is to show how ENER membership 
imposes conditions for the national regulatory agency to work under 
that change the competitive conditions at the national level, especially 
its influence on customer conditions and the incumbent.  
4.1 The Actors and Instrument 
There are four actors and one instrument that are considered in this 
policy-making model. The actors include: 
1) The national regulatory agency (NRA); 
2) The energy industry (consisting of existing 
incumbents); 
3) The government; and 
4) The European Commission (EC). 
The instrument through which the game is played is the ENER, 
which is defined in some detail above. The actors in this game are 
defined based on liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions, which 
presume that political structures within the EU come about through 
interaction between the EC (or other EU-level body), national 
government, and other interest groups (Schimmelfennig & Rittberger, 
2006). The interest groups in this case include the existing market 
incumbents (who represent an industry perspective) and the NRA 
 163 
 
(who represent a consumer perspective). These perspectives are the 
most common in national-level interest groups that move to the level of 
EU engagement, because of the dominance of economic interests in EU 
involvement (Schimmelfennig & Rittberger, 2006). While government 
interests are commonly understood to have dominance within a given 
national setting, there is some evidence that this could be fading due to 
erosion of national sovereignty concerns and the growth of regionalism 
(Keating & Hooghe, 2006). Thus, this traditional dominance of the 
national government‘s interest is not assumed in this model.  
4.2 The Two-Level Game 
The model used in this policy model is that of the two-level game, 
as described by Putnam (1988). Putnam‘s model of domestic and 
international politics was based on the observation that although it was 
clear that domestic and international politics influence each other, the 
mechanisms and direction of this influence is not always clear. Putnam 
(1988) used the metaphor of the two-level game to describe the 
interaction between the domestic and international level of political 
action, even between seemingly unrelated actors. He described this 
game as follows: 
―At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by 
pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians 
seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the 
international level, national governments seek to maximize their own 
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse 
consequences of foreign development. Neither of the two games can be 
ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain 
interdependent, yet sovereign (Putnam, 1988, p.434).‖ 
There are a number of implications of this basic model. One of these 
implications is that the national leader must carefully choose actions 
both at the domestic and international level, since these two games may 
have interests in conflict (Putnam, 1988). Furthermore, the political 
leader who makes the decisions (positioned by Putnam (1988) as the 
player positioned between the two boards) faces potential ejection if he 
does not balance the interests in play on both sides. As Putnam (1988) 
notes, it is sometimes possible for the player to cause a realignment that 
can result in realigned interests, but this is not always the case. This 
might be accomplished through the use of an information asymmetry, 
or a situation where one player knows something that another does not 
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(Milner, 1997). Milner (1997) offers a particular insight into how this 
might apply in the present research, noting that players may use 
endorsers to fill in the gaps in the case of incomplete information; thus, 
in order to generate agreement with incomplete information, an 
endorser is required (Milner, 1997). 
Putnam (1988) uses the theoretical and simplified case of ratification 
of a bargained agreement to demonstrate the possible outcomes of a 
two-level game. At Level I, an agreement on some topic is negotiated 
by actors at the international level (such as heads of state or designated 
delegates), on the basis that the agreement will only be adopted if it is 
accepted by the domestic power structure within a given country. At 
Level II, the agreement must be accepted through some mechanism at 
the domestic level, such as ratification in a national legislature. Based 
on this observation, Putnam (1988) observes that the agreement that is 
most likely to result is the one with the largest win-set, or the largest set 
of conditions that will prove acceptable at Level II. However, there is 
also a dependence on the Level II ―deliverability‖ at Level I, as states 
will be less likely to accept a given agreement if there is an expectation 
that it would not be ratified (particularly by a major partner in the 
agreement). This is the case whether defection is voluntary or 
involuntary. Thus, the two-level game is not just a game of influence of 
international politics at the national level, but is a game of 
interdependence and expectations between players at both levels. The 
effectiveness of game outcomes depends on level II institutions, 
preferences, and coalitions, as well as Level I negotiation strategies in 
use (Putnam, 1988).  
4.3 The Policy Model 
Based on the information above, the policy-making model that 
promotes ENER membership and, through this membership, the 
emergence of improved competitive conditions, can be specified as 
follows: 
1) The NRA‘s entry into the ENER serves as a means of 
transforming the competitive game into a two-level game as 
described by Putnam (1988), with the NRA playing the super-
national level, supported by the EC, without direct political 
interference from the government at the national level; and, 
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2) Entry also serves way to obtain a ‗certification‘ from the super-
national level and expand resources at the national level, 
increasing its resources in the national game and using the 
ENER as both a resource and an arena for expansion of play, 
characterized by the passage of increased transparency, 
accountability, and independence from the super-national to 
the national level. 
3) The result of this increased resources and power of the NRA 
(representing a consumer perspective) is increased competition 
(reduction in incumbent power). 
The figure below shows the two-level game and its effects on the 
outcomes of the situation as anticipated by the model. Within this 
model, the NRA acts in the central position as described by Putnam 
(1988), balancing the international and national interests and seeking 
out more resources at the national government level. This results in a 
reduction in the power of the existing industry incumbents, or in other 
words an increase in competition within the industry in question.  
 
4.3.1 Transformation to a Two-level Game 
There is a long history of domestic interests playing a role in the 
decision to enter (or to not enter) European regional political structures. 
Bulmer (1983) specifically located EC policy-making in the decisions 
made within the domestic political sphere, noting that the 
interdependencies created by the EC are driven by domestic political 
influences and priorities. Although the national polity may be the 
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primary level at which interests may be defended, it is also possible 
that interest groups may choose to seek out influence at higher levels 
(such as the EC) in order to achieve their objectives (Bulmer, 1983). 
Thus, Putnam‘s (1988) model must be expanded, since it is not just the 
head of state that is playing at the international level and managing 
interests at two levels. However, it cannot be assumed that this would 
be the same in all cases, since national polities vary widely (Bulmer, 
1983).  
4.3.2 Expanding Resources and Power 
There are a number of examples of EU regional networks that have 
used their participation in agencies similar to the ENERs at the 
international level to legitimate or certificate their authority at the 
national level, expanding their resources and power. One recent 
example is EU regional data privacy networks, which have used their 
regional cooperation structures and regulatory and management 
functions (a Level I interaction) to increase their level of power in the 
domestic political sphere (a Level II interaction) (Newman, 2011). In 
fact, it is the regional interaction itself that serves as a means of 
increasing the importance of the interaction on the domestic level. This 
is consistent with a liberal intergovernmentalist theory, which suggests 
that engagement in international governmental structures (such as the 
EU generally in the original authors‘ work, or the ENER in this 
research) actually strengthens the influence of the government in the 
domestic arena (Moravcsik, 1993). This research strongly suggests that 
the role of international engagement in the ENER would be to achieve 
domestic ends such as increasing resource availability rather than 
simply international interaction. Given the importance of the NRA in 
enforcing the consumer viewpoint, it can be presumed that the 
domestic ends that would eventually be achieved through the ENER 
involvement would be an expansion of resources for consumer 
interests at the national level.  
4.4 The Analysis Method 
The analysis method that will be used in this research is an 
analytical case study examining known examples of interaction 
between the EC and NRAs at the level of the ENER. This represents, 
fundamentally, a comparative policy analysis, in which policies across 
two different institutional regimes are compared in order to generate a 
theoretical understanding of a particular situation (Radaelli et al., 2012).  
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The goal of the research is to define a causal mechanism (ENER 
engagement) for a specific outcome (increased competition), while still 
taking into account the contextual influences of two distinct levels of 
interaction. This model is defined in the section above.  
We have chosen to perform a qualitative, analytical comparative 
case study between two states because of the potential limitations on 
quantitative analysis to lend insight into the relationships and 
operations of institutions (Scharpf, 2000). The role of context in causal 
analysis is particularly important in political analysis because it has an 
interaction effect that needs to be considered, and that should be 
integrated into the analysis process (Faletti & Lynch, 2009). The 
comparative case study cannot perform all the work of hypothesis 
proving, outside conditions where external conditions can be strictly 
controlled (Scharpf, 2000). This level of control is not possible in this 
instance, but the comparative case study can still provide valuable 
information about deviations as well as shared conditions within the 
framework. The case study can serve a number of purposes, including 
the development of a theoretical or working model for decision-making 
as well as potential extrapolation to other environments (Barzelay, 
2007). In this case, we have focused only on the causal mechanisms in 
play, drawing on government, institution, and journalistic sources as 
well as previous research and evidence to show the causal mechanisms 
of the policy-making model described above in play.  
There are, as Radaelli et al. (2012) pointed out, some particular 
challenges in comparative policy analysis that can emerge, such as 
institutional determinism and unfounded conjecture. By focusing on a 
non-deterministic policy-making model and using case studies of real 
energy industry regulatory situations, we avoid these problems, but we 
do recognize that they are a fundamental element of our research 
process. While quantitative approaches, as in econometric comparison 
of product-market regulation and competition within the EU, have 
been performed previously (Conway & Nicoletti, 2006), and have 
added useful information, we do not consider this to be an appropriate 
approach because it cannot take into account the context of the 
research. Thus, the comparative policy case study has been selected, 
and the research design and analysis has been approached carefully to 
avoid the potential pitfalls of conjecture or determinism.  
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5. Case Studies 
Case studies serve as microcosms for broader, global phenomena, 
with the methodology viable in making critical connections between 
single cases and the larger, environmental context in which these cases 
exist. The fortitude of case study research lies in the applicability of the 
cases to the phenomena being examined as well as the methodological 
design. The case studies selected for the qualitative analysis were 
chosen for their applicability to the two variables, namely ENER 
intervention as well as enhanced competition. However, the greatest 
relevance of these cases to this present inquiry is the diversity of the 
independent variables between the two cases. The nature of the energy 
sector, with its dynamic trade relationships and increasingly weighted 
influence on multiple dimensions of the global marketplace, warrants 
that diverse case studies be explored in order to draw conclusions 
regarding the impact of ENER intervention on energy competition.  
Grounding the case study selection, by extension, is the assumption 
that universal solutions to energy regulation and competition are 
neither viable nor sustainable in the global economy, as the gaps 
between supranational and domestic regulation vary between nation-
states.  The case studies addressed using the policy-making model 
outlined above include the Czech Republic and Spain. The Czech 
Republic discussion focuses on the harmonization of national 
requirements with CEER in the electricity and gas sectors. In Spain, the 
gas and electricity sectors and their relationship to ACER is the focus of 
discussion. The focus of these case studies is on the accountability, 
transparency, and independence of the ENERs and the resulting 
competition. In both cases, the ENER‘s focus on these three norms 
increased the available resources of the NRA and allowed them to 
reduce incumbent power and government support, expanding the 
focus on the consumer interests the NRA represents at the domestic 
level.  
The divergence between the Czech Republic‘s emphasis on national 
requirements and Spain‘s focus on its relationship to the ENER 
represents a critical distinction that is essential to this analysis, with the 
conversely similar focus on the gas and electricity sectors in both 
nations providing a strong mechanism for comparison. The variability 
between the case studies is sufficient enough to derive flexible and 
globally applicable conclusions from the analysis, with the similarities 
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between the cases concurrently necessary in order to forge meaningful 
connections between the case itself, energy competition, and ENER 
intervention. In short, the generalizability of the study is inextricably 
bound to the relevance of the Czech and Spanish case to the need for 
boosted energy competition throughout the EU.  
5.1 Czech Republic and the Adaptation to CEER Standards 
The Council of European Energy Regulators was established in 2000 
by ten national regulatory authorities1 to ease the creation of an 
integrated, competitive and sustainable European market for gas and 
electricity, and has become a non-profit association in 2003.  
The Czech Republic joined the European Union and CEER in 2004. 
It was therefore not a founding member of the Council. In the mid-
2000s, when a considerable number of new countries joined the EU, the 
CEER work programme was particularly concerned with the 
harmonization of different regional energy markets and the assessment 
of the real level of competition and barriers to energy trade (CEER 
2004).  
The first actions of the Czech government and the Czech Republic‘s 
Energy Regulatory Office (ERO), established in 2001, were focused on 
the assimilation of Czech energy legislation to the European acquis 
communautaire concerning the liberalization of the electricity and gas 
sectors (Czech Republic 2005: Chapters 1 and 2). This was not just 
based on the Czech Republic‘s internal priority. While EU principles of 
harmonisation do not require complete uniformity of law, they are 
intended to promote interoperability and especially the ability of the 
internal market to operate (Menski, 2005). Thus, the development of an 
electricity and gas market that was liberalised and highly competitive 
was consistent with EU internal market principles and would 
eventually be required.  
5.1.1 Independence 
Acting according to CEER advice, in 2004 and 2005 ERO supported the 
opening of the electricity market, which had already started some years 
earlier, and started a similar procedure for the gas market (Czech 
Republic 2007: Chapter 2). These procedures demanded some time, as 
                                                                
1 These ten NRAs were from Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
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it required organizing the electricity market and establishing a new 
methodology for price distribution in the gas market. A full 
liberalization of the electricity market came in 2006, while the gas 
market still remained partially closed until the following year (Czech 
Republic 2007: Chapters 3 and 5). The slow liberalization of the natural 
gas market can be attributed to a number of different factors, including 
control of gas storage units by incumbents and lack of production of 
natural gas in the Czech Republic, which served to initially increase the 
cost of natural gas compared to the pre-liberalization period (Mravec, 
2006). This suggests that at least initially the ERO could not take 
advantage of CEER and its independent position to improve its 
independent position, though eventually it would succeed (Czech 
Republic 2007).  
5.1.2 Transparency and Accountability 
In 2006, CEER concentrated, among other themes, on the 
transparency of information for national regulatory authorities (CEER 
2006). According to CEER (and ERGEG) vision, more timely 
information was necessary for market players to deal with the forces of 
the market and cope with price changes to develop informed decisions. 
The Council deemed public information particularly necessary when 
the companies managing the networks were connected to firms 
operating in the competitive part of the market (CEER 2006: 4). ERO 
implemented a more transparent web-site section on Frequently Asked 
Questions to inform customers on the main changes deriving from the 
establishment of the free market (ERO 2006: 16). This is consistent with 
the role of regulators as supporting the interests of customers, although 
it did not directly address cost controls for customers.  
This improvement of the regulator-customer communication took 
advantage of more interactive tools. For instance, to help customers 
with the liberalized market ERO released a web application to calculate 
the different costs of the various operators of the supply market to find 
the one which best suited their needs. The establishment of this tool 
was possible because of the requirement for suppliers to provide ERO 
with constant updates on their prices for small consumers (ERO 2007: 
16). In two-level game terms, this represents the elimination of 
information asymmetries between the industry incumbent and the 
consumer through the intermediation of the ERO; since this 
information asymmetry is a major source of game advantage, it would 
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serve to level the playing field (so to speak) between these consumers 
(Milner, 1997). ERO‘s communicative work in favour of competition 
continued with the diffusion of a series of comprehensive fliers on the 
changes that final customers should expect from the free market of 
energy (ERO 2007: 60).  
5.1.3 Advancements in Competition 
Concerning the increase of competition in the Czech energy market 
in the 2005-2007 period, the government and ERO took into 
consideration CEER indications for regulators and national institutions 
to contribute to the full implementation of the existing (First and 
Second Energy Packages) legislation, which was still partially 
unrealized (Czech Republic 2005: Chapter 2). Starting with electricity, 
the Czech regulator, in collaboration with the Office for the Protection 
of Competition, has enlarged and clarified the entities, which are 
covered by the competition legislation for the energy sector, which has 
come to encompass all public and private companies (Czech Republic 
2005: Chapter 3). ERO has underlined that the surveillance on 
electricity installations should be particularly severe, since new 
infrastructures take time to be built, therefore leaving space to a de facto 
network monopoly for some time to come (Czech Republic 2006: 
Chapter 3). 
Moving to the gas sector, the main measures taken by the energy 
and competition regulators came after an abuse of dominant position 
on the part of gas trader RWE Transgas (2006 Report on the Activities 
and Finances of the Energy Regulatory Office: Chapter 4). This misuse 
led to the creation of price caps on the gas trader to avoid a new market 
abuse while allowing customers to switch to a more favourable trader, 
when possible. These punitive measures where removed only when the 
company agreed with the two regulators to the establishment of an 
equal starting condition for all the interested suppliers in the market 
(Czech Republic 2006: Chapter 4). This episode had two main 
consequences. First, RWE Transgas decided to adopt a transparent 
selling procedure to avoid committing new abuses. Second, the full 
liberalization of the gas market was accomplished (Office for the 
Protection of Competition 2006; Zapletnyuk 2006). 
Even following the liberalization of the market between 2006 and 
2007, the Czech electricity and gas markets remained highly 
concentrated with existing incumbents maintaining most of the 
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distribution power (European Commission, 2007). However, Czech 
energy markets have continued to evolve, with the development of 
unbundling and requirements for independence in generation and 
transmission, as well as limited-period trading licences (Spodniak et al., 
2012). Additionally, the Czech Republic has moved away from 
dominance of its traditional players, with German and Slovakian 
companies entering the energy market in preparation for a single 
energy market (Spodniak et al., 2012). Thus, while ERO may have 
originally faced challenges in implementing a liberalized market and 
improving competition, it is clear that this is no longer the case.  
Consistent with our argument, this illustration clearly shows that 
even a voluntary association, such as CEER, in collaboration with 
another de-facto voluntary association, ERGEG, had a detectable effect 
on competition in the Czech Republic‘s energy sector, a representative 
of the younger and less regulated generation of EU countries. This 
influence was contextualized by the Czech Republic‘s need to 
harmonize its competitive regime with the EU as a late entrant, as well 
as the dominance of the incumbent within the market, which made the 
implementation of a fully competitive market difficult. However, these 
conditions are likely to ease over time as the industry becomes less 
dominated by existing inputs.  
5.2 Spain and the creation of ACER 
Spain, as a long-time member of the European Community, has seen 
the creation of all the European Networks of Energy Regulators and is 
part of CEER, MEDREG, and ERGEG/ACER at the present time. In this 
case study, we concentrate on the effects that the creation of ACER and 
its Third Energy Package provisions have exerted on this 
Mediterranean country.  
In 2009, when ACER was established, the Spanish energy market 
offered a mixed picture (Spain 2010). On the one hand, energy usage 
had peaked and access tariffs had been continuously increasing for 
electricity for a long time, leading to a substantial increase in end-user 
prices. On the other hand, interconnection capacity has enlarged due to 
new infrastructural connections (Spain 2011: 7, 106). These connections 
increase the number of opportunities (therefore, the competition) for 
cross-border gas and electricity trade with Spain‘s neighbours (Spain 
2011: 22). This was a substantial improvement from just a few years 
previously, where Spain had only a few interconnections with 
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neighbouring countries and traded less than 3.5% of its energy demand 
on the European market (Conejo, 2007).  
5.2.1 Advancements in Competition  
The creation of ACER through the EU Third Energy Package has 
represented a stimulus for the concrete increase of competition 
measures in the country. ACER‘s mission indeed touches upon market 
monitoring, with a focus on energy trading and infrastructure issues in 
EU states, which are also all members of the Agency. In the 
implementation phase of the Third Package in EU countries, ACER has 
acted as a watchdog (Regulation (EC) No 713/2009: Article 6-8; 
Directive 2009/72/EC: Article 40; Directive 2009/73/EC: Article 35). 
The unbundling provisions of the package were particularly delicate to 
supervise, since countries could choose among three different 
unbundling models by March 2012, but they could benefit from 
exemptions for new gas and electricity infrastructures (Regulation (EC) 
714/2009: Article 17; Directive 2009/73/EC: Article 36).  
A direct reference to the advancement of competition and the fight 
against abuses of market dominance is contained in the renewed 
collaboration between CNE and the Spanish National Competition 
Commission (CNC), as made explicit in the Law on Sustainable 
Economy.2 For electricity, generation and supply are scrutinized and 
monitored by CNE to examine market results and bids. At the same 
time, CNC can investigate for anticompetitive behaviour in supply 
activities (such as the switching of operator) and energy generation. For 
gas, special attention is given to the provision of gas and the supply 
contracts, to avoid discrimination and cross-subsidies. When vertical 
undertakings are present, the entire subsidiary and group companies, 
as well as the parent company, should provide CNE with their annual 
accounts. 
5.2.2 Accountability 
So far, Spain has actively intervened on the majority of legal 
requirements coming from the new European energy arrangement, 
while some secondary issues still have to be fully implemented. In 
March 2011, the Sustainable Economy Law passed various acts 
                                                                
2 Ministerio 2011, http://www.thespanisheconomy.com/ SiteCollectionDocuments/en-
gb/Economic%20Policy%20Measures/110222%20StrategySustainableEconomy.pdf, 
accessed 15/07/2012. 
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concerning the energy sector. In particular, the law transposed a good 
part of the requirements concerning new powers to the Comìsion 
Nacional de Energìa (CNE), the Spanish Regulator for Electricity and 
Gas.3 While in 2010 the country counted forty companies acting as 
retailers for gas in its market, the number has changed to sixty-nine at 
the end of 2011, once all the energy provisions contained in the law 
were passed (Spain 2012: 106, see figure below). However, not only the 
number of suppliers changed but also the market share the new 
entrants owned. At the end of 2011, new entrants in the market had 
taken up the majority of the energy market share (Spain 2011: 90). This 
change sustains the hypothesis that the creation of ACER and the 
consequent empowerment of CNE resulted in a stronger openness of 
the Spanish energy market. However, it should also be noted that the 
Spanish government has also taken a strong position on the energy 
market by manipulating tariffs to keep retail energy prices low (Bravo, 
2012). This has resulted in a significant cost to manufacturers who are 
asked to cover the deficit, in a reversal of the usual practice of 
governments to support industry rather than consumers. There have 
also been a number of other indications that the Spanish energy 
regulator is focused on the reduction of incumbent power, such as the 
deregulation of tariffs in 2008-2009 for most categories of customers 
and the discontinuation of a Virtual Power Plant (VPP) auction 
program that had previously served to increase incumbent 
concentration (Federico, 2010). Thus, it is not a coincidence that the 
Spanish market is becoming increasingly liberalized, but is instead the 
immediate outcome of changes in government and regulator policies 
intended to promote liberalization and reduction of incumbent 
positions.    
                                                                
3 Ministerio de Economìa y Hacienda 2011, http://www.thespanisheconomy.com/ 
SiteCollectionDocuments/en-gb/Economic%20Policy%20Measures/ 
110222%20StrategySustainableEconomy.pdf, accessed 15/07/2012. 
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Source: CNE Report to the EU Commission 2011 - Spanish Retail Gas Market 
Evolution, p. 90. 
5.2.3 Independence 
The unbundling issue has been documented to be another testing 
ground of the strong relationship between ACER and national 
regulatory authorities, as expressed in the ACER tasks.4  Unbundling is 
a common response to excessive concentration in in network industries, 
and it has been implemented in the EU acquis commaunitaire through 
Directive 96/92/EC among others (Fichert et al., 2007). It is also a 
fundamental aspect of increasing energy production through 
renewable sources, which is often a task taken up by small energy 
producers rather than market-dominant incumbents (de Lovinfosse & 
Varone, 2004). Thus, there was considerable impetus for unbundling 
resulting from long-standing market pressures in this area. The 
unbundling regime of ACER members and others is determined by 
Directive 2009/72/EC (for the electricity market) and 2009/73/EC (for 
the natural gas market) (European Commission, 2009).  
 Based on the EC requirements for unbundling and the guidance 
offered for electricity, it was possible to choose between the ownership 
                                                                
4 See ACER Website, Tasks Section, http://acernet.acer.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 
ACER_HOME/Activities/Tasks_and_responsibilities/ACER_tasks, accessed 15/07/2012. 
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unbundling of the Transmission System Operator (TSO), a full 
separation between the transmission networks and the generation and 
supply activities; the Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) option, 
that requires the network to be managed by a subsidiary company; and 
the Independent System Operator (ISO) choice, which allows the 
company to retain the ownership while releasing all issues concerning 
operation, maintenance and investment to an independent company. In 
July 2010, CNE advised the competent Spanish Ministry on the 
necessity to transpose the EU Directive concerning unbundling for 
these companies (Spain 2011: 12). In 2011, a Spanish law officially 
divided the operation of the transmission system from the transport 
and ownership of assets into two different companies both referring to 
the ENAGAS group (Spain 2011: 13).  
5.2.4 Transparency 
ACER‘s provisions under the Third Energy Package on the sharing 
of good practices between NRAs have provided CNE with enhanced 
powers to improve the transparency of the supply market. First, CNE 
has worked toward the establishment of a fair energy environment for 
the actors involved (Regulation 1227/2011). For instance, CNE can 
suspend the payment of incentives for photovoltaic plants in case it 
finds irregularities and it is entitled to determine a maximum number 
of hours for photovoltaic plants to receive the subsidized price, so that 
no actor can over-profit from contributions. Second, CNE has invested 
on a more transparent communication strategy (Royal Decree Law 
1/2012). To promote market transparency, the regulator has created a 
web price comparison tool for gas and electricity offers, to help 
consumers in their choice. Finally, CNE has increased its internal 
accountability, so to qualify itself as a balanced arbiter between the 
various actors of the energy market. Specifically, according to the 
European Directives, the Spanish legislator has established that CNE 
should be independent from political and economic interests through a 
strict appointing scheme for the Chairperson and six Commissioners of 
the CNE Board (Spain 2011: 19, 20). 
In summary, the Spanish energy sector has benefited from a 
stronger environment for competition with the implementation of the 
ACER founding provisions, while the national energy regulator, CNE, 
has strengthened its role as the connection between ACER and the 
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Spanish energy actors. This illustration provides further support for the 
usefulness and logic of our theoretical argument. 
6. Discussion of Results 
Clearly, two case studies cannot serve to completely illustrate the 
potential range of regulatory regimes, national polities, and interactions 
between the domestic and international political environments that the 
EU encompasses. However, both the Czech Republic (a late entrant into 
both the EU and its attendant ENERs) and Spain (which was present at 
the founding of most of these groups and has continued to serve as a 
member of several ENERs) show that ENER membership on the part of 
the national regulating agency serves a number of purposes, especially 
increased competition and interaction. Thus, the NRAs within these 
countries are both joining the ENER initially as a means of 
harmonization, and are then using this harmonization to increase their 
own access to resources, as expressed within the model. In this section, 
we discuss these findings and compare the Czech Republic and Spain 
with the policy model to show how the case studies reflect the model. 
The first step in the model was that the NRA joined the ENER as a 
means of creating a two-level game; that is by joining the ENER, the 
NRA placed itself in the position of the government decision-maker in 
Putnam‘s (1988) model, making decisions that simultaneously had to 
be accepted at the domestic and international level. This finding is not 
without precedent, as previous research had suggested precisely this 
mechanism in other EU agencies (Bulmer, 1983). The Czech Republic 
shows this most clearly, perhaps because it did not join the EU during 
the foundational period. Instead, its movement toward integration and 
harmonization of its gas and electricity markets can be seen as part of a 
general harmonization effort undertaken as part of its relatively late 
entry into the EU. Conversely, there is relatively little evidence about 
why Spain may have initially joined its member ENERs; however, since 
it was a foundational member that accepted the principles, it can be 
presumed that its membership was also driven by the explicit desire to 
move energy policy from Level II to Level I. 
The second step in the model was that the NRA used its ENER 
membership as a means of increasing its power and effectiveness at 
home. This was shown in previous research in areas such as data 
protection agencies, where membership in regional bodies was used to 
 178 
 
legitimate increases in power at home (Moravcsik, 1993; Newman, 
2011). It is here that Milner‘s (2007) observation regarding information 
asymmetry can be seen in play. For example, the creation by the Czech 
regulator ERO to explicitly provide consumers with information about 
tariffs charged by various incumbents in the market is a clear approach 
to reducing or eliminating an information asymmetry that benefits the 
supplier more than it does the consumer. Ultimately, this reduces the 
switching costs associated with the choice of an electric supplier and 
reduces uncertainty for the consumer. This example solidifies the role 
of the electricity regulator as a body that is primarily interested in the 
consumer viewpoint or interest, rather than the industry viewpoint. 
There are also other actions the Spanish government has taken, 
including artificially holding down electricity costs, that emphasize the 
importance of the consumer as compared to the producer. Thus, the use 
of legitimated or licenced Level I powers associate with joining an 
ENER and operating at the international level to benefit the consumer 
(the main stakeholder group the regulating body represents) is held up 
by the findings as well. 
The final stage in the policy-making model is the causal element; 
that is, does the joining of an ENER and the attendant increase in 
domestic power and influence on the part of the regulator independent 
of government control increase competition in the market through 
transparency, independence, and accountability? Both cases profiled in 
this research strongly suggest that it does. Although the Czech 
Republic‘s market liberalization did get off to a slow start because of 
control of vital infrastructure by incumbents, the market has become 
increasingly competitive over time, in large part due to increasing 
transparency in pricing and rates and other factors. Similar, the 
concentration of the energy market in Spain has fallen over time (thus 
indicating more competition), and explicit unbundling requirements 
have also increased independence of transmission, generation, and so 
on. These improvements have not been generated through an isolated 
system of improvements, but have instead been created through 
cooperation within CEER, ACER, ERGEG, and other ENERs that have 
negotiated high-level agreements to promote liberalization and 
unbundling. 
Ultimately, the findings of this research do support the application 
of a model of a two-level game to the interactions of NRAs, the EC, 
ENERs, and national governments, as well as the interests of industry 
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and customers. The application of this model has shown that the issue 
of interests is complex, with harmonization between EC and national 
laws being a driving factor, but national political environments also 
informing the formation of EC laws. This suggests that the causal and 
contextual mechanisms of decision-making in this area are highly 
complex, justifying the use of a qualitative analytical approach.  
7. Conclusion 
We offer both a theoretical argument as well as empirical support in 
favour of an augmenting effect that a regulatory agency has on the 
competition level of a country. The theoretical argument is based on the 
two-level game, in which an agreement is first negotiated at the 
international level, and then at the domestic (national) level, in order to 
create an international organization. This was demonstrated through 
the European Network of Energy Regulators (ENER). ENERs establish 
a regulatory framework (representing the first level of the game), 
which increases accountability, transparency and independence of 
policy decision-making in the energy sector of a country (the outcomes 
of the second level of the game). In consequence, the competition level 
in the energy sector grows in the member states. These results cast light 
on the level of compliance that ENERs are able to obtain from member 
NRAs, which is relevant if compared to the overall influence that inter-
governmental energy organizations exert on member states.  
The empirical evidence offered focused on the Czech Republic and 
its membership in CEER and Spain and its membership in ACER. The 
Czech Republic’s case is primarily focused on its alignment to the 
acquis communautaire as represented by CEER following its 2004 EU 
ascension. Spain’s involvement in ACER is more focused on 
development of energy markets and supply, rather than alignment of 
regulations and the general body of EU law, owing to its more long-
term position within the EU. However, both cases were successful in 
demonstrating that the international level of negotiations through 
CEER or ACER did influence the national-level agreements and 
operations within the country, whether this was legislative or market-
based.    
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The cases of the Czech Republic shows qualitatively that 
involvement in an ENER such as CEER  can have strong effects on 
competition within the domestic market for electricity and gas. Some of 
this effect can be attributed to general harmonization and alignment of 
market structures, as in the case of the Czech Republic, which 
undertook a deliberate liberalization effort alongside its CEER 
membership. This liberalization effort, which was a condition of 
involvement with the EU and alignment with the acquis 
communautaire, was directly undertaken to diversify the supplier 
market in the Czech Republic (which is primarily a consumer country). 
The liberalization did not move at the same rate in the electricity and 
gas markets; notably, liberalization in the gas market only proceeded 
following the exposure of the abuse of a dominant market position by 
RWE Transgas. Thus, the initial market liberalization and involvement 
with CEER did not produce immediate effects. However, it did 
eventually result in a liberalized natural gas market as well as an 
energy market, increasing the potential efficiency of the market and its 
operation. 
With the case of Spain, this analysis has also shown that 
involvement in the ENER, with its construction of norms that 
encourage competition, increased accountability, independence, and 
transparency within the respective energy industries of these countries.  
The goal of Spain, which had benefited from a long-term membership 
in the EU and expanding cross-border connections, was not 
harmonization of regulations and market liberalization but instead 
leveraging its existing capacity in order to take advantage of the cross-
border supply and demand it could access. Spain is also distinct from 
the Czech Republic in that it had an active role in the initial negotiation 
of ACER rules and general EU regulations in the energy sector, and 
thus can set its participation more on its own terms. However, this case 
also shows that independence, transparency, and efficiency were 
increased by Spain’s involvement with ACER. Efficiency is of course 
implied by the expansion of transmission grids across borders, 
enabling more efficient distribution of energy within a common energy 
market. Involvement in ACER also resulted in the expansion of firms 
taking part in the energy market, for example increasing the number of 
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gas firms from 40 in 2010 to 69 in 2011. Finally, independence was 
addressed through unbundling, which served to reduce the dominance 
of large-scale market competitors. Thus, the causal mechanism 
proposed in the policy-making model that formed the core of this 
research was supported by the case studies, showing a strong 
improvement in competition in the target countries. This general causal 
mechanism held even across states with markedly different levels of 
market development and participation. 
Future research should advance the theoretical debate as well as 
empirical testing by looking into the set-up of these regulatory agencies 
and what this implies for competition. Questions that could lead this 
debate might be: How independent are the regulatory agencies from 
political concerns? How much policy-making capacity do these 
regulatory agencies have? What differences can be seen in the structure 
of ENERs that influence the outcomes of competition within these 
industries? Looking closer into the set-up and functioning of the 
different ENERs could explain why some ENERs have significant 
effects while others do not. Another research area could be to extend 
this analysis from the European context to other areas, such as African 
or Asian energy markets. This could help show whether there are 
conditions specific to the EU that promote the increase in competition 
through the use of the ENER, or whether this is a generalizable state of 
affairs that could improve competition around the world. Given that 
even with the addition of the present research, information in this area 
is still very sparse, any of these areas of further research would 
represent a significant improvement in the existing literature on the 
role of ENERs in energy competition.  It should also be noted that 
ENERs operate within a third layer of overarching international 
negotiation, the European Union itself, which to some extent directs the 
actions and scope of the ENERs and takes a direct interest in energy 
policy. Thus, a final extension of this research could consider the 
overarching influence of the EU on the operation of ENERs and 
ultimately, their reach into the member states, and examine where 
different levels of operation take priority.  
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- 5 - 
Conclusions and Implications 
1. Summary and Conclusions 
 This volume has focused on the emergence of the energy IGO 
on the international organization stage and the implications of this 
emergence for international relations and energy policy. The analysis 
included the use of quantitative research covering a wide range of 
institutions and the qualitative research, comparing just a few case 
studies in far more detail. This mixture of methods throughout the 
book has provided breadth and depth to the analysis, allowing for a 
better understanding of the problems we are concerned with. Although 
many of these findings seem diverse, over the course of the chapters 
some general findings can be summarized and some lessons can be 
drawn.  
In chapter 1, we set the stage for analysis and defined the 
theoretical foundations and terms of our work. By extending the use of 
the rational design model proposed by Koromenos et al. (2001) and 
including the functional variables of aid in case of energy shortage and 
coordinated oligopolistic systems, we offer a means of understanding 
the role of the IGO from a functional viewpoint and not just the 
structural or institutional viewpoint suggested by rationalist IR theory. 
This extension enables us to consider the broader issues involved in the 
foundation of energy IGOs and to examine them as places of 
negotiation, intervention, and enactment of both narrow and wide 
national and international principles. This chapter also offered 
description and explanation of how quantitative and qualitative data 
was selected and discussed the use of the rational design model and its 
variables within the qualitative and quantitative analyses. Finally, it 
presented descriptive data about the organizations discussed in the 
following chapters, offering an insight into the present-day landscape 
of energy IGOs.  
Chapter 2 presents a quantitative analysis of energy IGOs. This 
analysis focused on the relationships between trade, infrastructure, and 
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international organization diffusions. In addition to rational design, it 
used theories of collective action to understand how energy IGOs have 
diversified and spread. In this chapter, we posited that countries are 
incentivised to join energy IGOs by shared energy security concerns 
and with a goal of coordinating energy policies across national 
boundaries. We also posited that the provisions included in the 
foundational agreements of the energy IGO play a significant role in 
their proliferation (or indeed, non-proliferation). The analysis in this 
chapter used panel data covering 34 different IGOs over 38 years (from 
1970 to 2007), with network analysis providing the main insights in 
regard to the establishment of energy IGOs. We then used spatial 
econometrics to demonstrate the diffusion of these IGOs over time. In 
order to test the validity of the findings from these methods, we then 
used additional evidence regarding the foundation and diffusion of 
energy IGOs, with information on oil and gas pipelines, design and 
types of energy IGOs, and differences in oil and gas markets being 
considered as a means of understanding how these results can be 
interpreted. Ultimately, this analysis indicates that countries join 
energy IGOs in response to the actions of their competitors and trading 
partners, that countries that share pipelines are more likely to join the 
same IGOs, and that design features of the IGO influence the speed at 
which it spreads. 
In Chapter 3, we switch gears for qualitative analysis of reasons 
for joining energy IGOs. In this chapter, we proposed that shared 
energy security concerns are a necessary (though not necessarily 
sufficient) condition for formation of a new energy IGO or joining an 
existing IGO. We further proposed that on joining the IGO, member 
states had an increased rate of construction of shared energy 
infrastructure, such as shared pipelines or energy transmission grids. 
This is a two-stage process, which we formulated as foundation and 
enforcement. We used two cases, including the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), to 
demonstrate these points. The IEA is the oldest consumer energy IGO, 
having been founded in 1974, while the SCO is primarily a mutual 
defence organization and was only founded in 1996-1997 as the 
Shanghai Five. However, the two organizations shared commonalities 
in their foundation and in post-foundation infrastructure activities. IEA 
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members, primarily drawn from the OECD states, found common 
cause in the energy price spikes of the early 1970s, while the energy 
security concerns of the SCO emerged gradually as the participant 
countries began both producing and consuming more energy. 
However, both organizations were driven by the alignment of energy 
interests, primarily within a given region. After foundation, members 
of both energy IGOs began to undertake shared infrastructure projects, 
particularly between countries that are geographically contiguous or 
that are separated by cooperative transit countries. Thus, energy 
security priorities are a foundational impetus for the energy IGO, 
which is then used as an instrument for achieving these priorities. 
Chapter 4 is our final analysis chapter, and we once again 
undertake a qualitative comparison, this time at the country level. In 
this chapter, we address the European Networks of Energy Regulators 
(ENERs), which are a class of energy IGOs that are made up of 
national-level energy regulatory agencies (NRAs). We posit that the 
main role of the ENER is to promote fair competition in line with the 
acquis communautaire, promoting governance practices of 
accountability, transparency, and independence. The goal of this 
increased competition is to promote efficiency within national energy 
markets. To explore this framework, we used a simplified policy-
making model that described the actors and instruments through 
which this policy goal was achieved. The cases of the Czech Republic 
and Spain and their participation in CEER and ACER respectively 
demonstrated how the goals of accountability, transparency, and 
independence were achieved, as well as some of the problems that 
were encountered in the transition to an open market. Particularly 
relevant is the uneven progress of participation, such as the Czech 
Republic’s relatively rapid liberalization of its electricity market 
compared to its gas market. This chapter showed that engagement with 
energy IGOs helped improve efficiency, not just infrastructure, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 3. 
What is the ultimate lesson we can take away from this 
research? Perhaps the most important lesson is that energy IGOs are an 
expression of the interdependence of nations in the arena of energy 
security. Nations form or join IGOs in response to specific energy 
concerns, although generalized trade relationships and diplomatic 
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relationships obviously play a significant role in the decision to form or 
join as well. Furthermore, once they belong to these IGOs they use 
them to enact various energy priorities directed to reduction of the 
danger of energy shortages and coordination of oligopolistic activities, 
like building shared infrastructure. Finally, we can see from this 
research that there are positive effects on markets and energy 
availability for the nations that participate. These findings show that 
energy IGOs act as a means of enacting national-level policy through 
international-level interdependence and cooperation. It also shows that, 
given the tendency of nations to join energy IGOs based on the actions 
of economic competitors, energy IGOs represent a sphere of 
international cooperation and international competition. 
 
2. Contribution to International Relations Literature  
 This research offers some interesting insights into the IR 
literature regarding international competition and cooperation. One of 
the most important findings from this perspective is that countries may 
join energy IGOs based on several factors, which include both the 
membership of cooperating countries and the membership of 
competing countries, and shared energy security concerns among both 
cooperating and competing countries. This suggests that the role of 
energy in the international arena has superseded a rationalist model of 
state autonomy, sovereignty, and individual interests in competition. 
Instead, the energy IGO and its effects implies that at least in some 
areas, independence and interdependence of states and the effects on 
actions and interests is a more appropriate model for considering 
international engagement at the IGO level. Rather than simply acting as 
the mouthpiece of a dominant state, the energy IGO acts as a semi-
neutral ground for states to negotiate shared interests even among 
competitors. This does not extent to all energy IGOs, some of which are 
dominated by the interests of a single state, such as the China-
dominated SCO, or a single region, such as the primarily Middle 
Eastern focus of the OECD. However, other IGOs do offer shared 
ground between competing nations, and even encourage development 
of increased liberalization of markets and shared infrastructure 
between them. Thus, the key contribution of this research to the IR 
literature is that energy IGOs do not act as a simple policy arm at the 
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national level, but instead represent the importance of interdependence 
at the international level.   
 
3. Contribution to Energy Literature  
 The research in this volume has a number of important 
contributions to make to the energy literature. One of these 
contributions is showing why states found or join energy IGOs in the 
first place. The existence of energy IGOs like the IEA and others is often 
taken for granted in the energy literature, and are viewed as a given in 
models of understanding international energy cooperation. However, 
as this research demonstrates, the existence of energy IGOs is not a 
given. Instead, it is precipitated by shared energy concerns between not 
just cooperating states, but also competing states. This suggests that to 
some extent energy concerns may override or dominate international 
competition rules. This research also provides a structural and 
functional explanation for the development of shared energy 
infrastructure, showing that it constitutes and is constituted by the 
foundation of energy IGOs. Shared pipelines are shown to be a factor in 
joining IGOs whose pipeline partners also belong to them. At the same 
time, energy IGO membership is viewed as being a factor in the further 
development of shared energy infrastructure. Finally, energy IGOs are 
foundational to the development of effective market structures and 
governance at the national level. This suggests that energy IGOs are not 
just an overlay on infrastructure and market development and 
liberalization. Instead, the energy IGO is foundational to the 
participating state’s ability to enact these state-level policies.  
 
4. Originality of the Research 
 There are a number of original aspects of this research that 
should be considered as a means of understanding future research. The 
foundational model of the research offers some uniqueness because of 
our supplementation of the six original variables of the rational design 
model with two additional functional variables. These functional 
variables introduce specific mechanisms of action, rather than simply 
structure, through which energy IGOs can be seen to work. In Chapter 
2, we examined the importance of oil and gas pipelines and their role in 
encouraging membership in the same energy IGOs for the countries 
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that share them. As far as we could determine, no other researchers 
have studied the role of shared oil and gas pipelines as a precipitating 
factor in energy IGO membership.  This finding is particularly 
important given the increasing incidence of shared energy pipelines 
and the development of long-range natural gas pipelines. In this 
chapter, we additionally found that energy IGO membership was a 
function of both competition and cooperation, broadening the scope of 
understanding the joining mechanisms. In Chapter 3, the originality of 
the findings hinges on the two-level game and multiple mechanisms of 
action. This chapter shows that energy IGOs are reacting to both 
national and international imperatives in joining IGOs and the 
subsequent actions within them, and also that the energy IGO acts as a 
venue for enactment of national-level priorities in the international 
arena. Finally, Chapter 4 shows that energy IGOs act as a means of not 
just securing energy supplies, but also improving efficiency and market 
functionality. Thus, the overall originality of this research is that it 
demonstrates the functionality of the energy IGO not just as a means of 
direct action by the state, but as a means of cooperating and competing 
in order to improve outcomes. 
 
5. Future Steps  
There are a number of opportunities for future research that 
these chapters suggest in general, along with the additional 
opportunities for research outlined in the chapter conclusions. One of 
the most obvious applications of future research is considering whether 
the models used in this research, such as rational design theory and the 
two-level game, can be applied to other categories of IGOs. This 
application of the method of this research to other categories of data 
could further expand the theorization of IGOs. An area that this 
research touches on that is currently somewhat under-theorized is the 
impetus for expansion of international organizations. Most of the work 
done in theorization of this area is based on the EU, and most of it 
focuses on issues like economic expansion. Currently, the theoretical 
explanation for expansion is relatively robust for applicants, but there 
are only vague mechanisms proposed for the expansion from the 
existing members’ perspective. Definition of further reasons to expand 
energy IGOs, or IGOs in general, could offer an expanded perspective 
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on the role of IGOs in the international arena. Engaging in historical 
research in this area could also help shed light on the changes in the 
role of IGOs that have come with increasing globalization and flows of 
goods, people, ideas, and capital across national boundaries. This 
theoretical expansion could help illuminate how states have 
maintained independence through interdependence.   
 
 
 
